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Preface
The Silver Purchase Act of 193^ — '/hen we hear
that phrase or title we immediat ely interpret it in our
own minds as having something to do wi th buying silver.
If we become curious we ask ourselves, "7/hy do we want
to buy silver?' 1 "Who are we buying it from?" and "What
will we do with it after we get it?" These and many
other questions are passed off with brief answers as,
"We want silver to back our money." "We need it in our
treasury." "We are buying silver from the mines, or
China, or England." or "We will use it to make more
money for the people of the United States."
These answers are very insufficient and while all
of them are practically correct, none of them really
gives a just explanation of the act. The Silver Pur-
chase Act may not be as important as some of the Acts
passed by Congress in 193^> yet it has had a decided
effect on the future of the silver market. The imme-
diate effect on the people of the United States may be
very slight. Nevertheless, the Act has been the cause
of pronounced changes in the currency systems of China
and Mexico, and has threatened that of India. There-
fore, a careful study of the situation seems, to be
warrented despite the fact that there are those who
believe it is a comparatively insignificant issue in
national and international economics.
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2Uses of Silver,
Before we try to analyze the Silver Purchase Act,
there are several things we must know about silver.
First, there are the uses of silver. Since time im-
memorium the people of this world have considered gold
and silver as the precious metals. The primitive
peoples prized them because of their luster. The 1'irst
coins are believed to have been made about 700 B. C. of
electrum, a natural alloy of gold and silver which was
found in the western part of Asia, (l) X!e find that
Croesus in 561 B, C. changed from these to a double
standard of silver coins and gold coins, (2)
From that time until the 18th century silver and
gold were used more or less as a double standard. In
1816 Great Britain legally abandoned silver, although
actually she had been on a single gold standard for
some years, due to the gold price of silver being out of
proportion with the mint ratio. (3)
1. MacDonald, G. The Involution of Coinage, Page 5.
University of Cambridge, G. Putnams* Sons. 1916
2. Same as 1, page 8,
3. Gresham’s Law -- Two or more forms of money in use
in a country and one is less valuable than the
other, the less valuable will circulate, the more
valuable will disappear.

3Not until 1873 did the silver question become very-
serious. In that year Germany, because of large gold
reparations received from the Franco-Prussian war, was
able to adopt the gold standard, (l) This caused Germany
to dump large amounts of silver on the market, prices of
silver fell, and several other countries were forced to
abandon silver. The Latin Monetary Union was formed to
try and keep silver coins in circulation. Even India, a
country strongly instilled in a silver standard, abandon-
ed it in 1893. By 1900 when the United States gave up
silver as a monetary base, China was the chief country on
the silver standard, although India still took large
amounts from the world market every year.
At the time of the world war there was a great demand
for silver. It rose in price and large quantities were
drained out of China. In 1920, however. Great Britain who
had bought a good deal of silver to keep India on a silver
standard, demonetized her silver coins. France ceased
coinage of silver coins. For a time the excess silver on
the market was quickly taken up by Germany and Austria-
Hungary, who needed the metal to meet the demand of their
people for a hard money.
1. France paid Germany $54,600,000 in gold coin.
Laughlin, History of Bimetalism. D. Appleton and Company
New York. Page 136.
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But by 1926 things had changed. India, in accord-
ance with a government decree was disposing, though not
as fast as originally planned, of her excess reserves of
silver. France demonetized her coins in 1928 and French
Indo-China, and Siam in 1929 and 1931 respectively. Pro-
duction reached a higher point than ever before in his-
tory. This was partially due to the fact that Mexico,
the chief producer, was at peace instead of in the midst
of an internal revolution as she had been at the time of
the world war. Supply exceeded demand, and the price of
silver fell, reducing its value as a monetary base.
Silver is used to some extent in the arts, as jewel-
ry and silver ware, and in industry, due to certain chem-
ical properties. J. S. Lawrence in his article, TIThe Un-
importance of Silver”
,
says that 1/5 of the annual supply
of silver is used for industry, (l)
Silver Market
A second thing to consider is the facilities for the
sale and transfer of silver. There are markets which deal
in silver bullion as other markets deal in wheat. The
L ondon market sets the price and the others base their
prices accordingly. This is partly due to tradition for
there is one silver brokerage house that ante-dates the
bank of England 10 years. (2)
1. J. S. Lawrence, "The Unimportance of Silver”
World f s Work. August 1931.
2. The Silver Market. Department of Commerce 1932.
Government Printing Office, Washington D. C. 1933
.1
.
1 It.
5 .
There are many other reasons; the wide spread of
London banks and British interest, and the financial
eminence of London and the pound sterling. London is
the center of shipping and cable connections. Also it
it a strong market because of the lack of speculation,
as English brokers aren't allowed to work for themselves.
Mr. H. K. Hachschild ranks the markets as follows;
Shanghai, Bombay, New York, and London, (l) New York is
important because it is a market that allows dealings in
futures. Shanghai is important because of the large
speculation in foreign exchange and bullion in that mar-
ket, being a broader market there is less chance of
squeezes. All the markets are interrelated as members of
one market buy and sell in the other markets.
The London market is controlled by four banking
houses; Moratta and Goldsmith, Samuel Montague and Com-
pany, Pixley and Abell, and sharps and Wilkins. Repre-
sentatives of these concerns meet every week day at 1:45
and at 11:30 on Saturdays to set the price of silver.
Each firm brings its orders from banks, brokers, buyers,
and sellers, and the price is determined by supply and
demand. The price is given in pence per standard ounce.
1. Department of Commerce Bulletin. The Silver Market,
1932. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.
'.
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(standard ounce equals .925 grains fine) The commission
is paid on the purchase, not on the sale. It is set at
1/8 of 1% when the price is over 21d. per standard ounce
and 22s. per 10,000 standard ounces when the price is
21d. or less. One pound is the minimum for buyer f s fee.
It is an unwritten law among London brokers to execute all
selling orders at prices fixed at the next fixing, but
they don»t agree to buy at the market. In regard to de-
livery, a buyer for spot gets delivery within 7 days at
theoption of the seller. Buyers in futures receive de-
livery two calendar months from the date of contract.
No days of grace are allowed. In the case of buyers of
options, delivery in one month or more is usual, the
price depending on the price of futures.
Source of Silver Supply.
The last thing to determine is the source of supply.
Most of the silver is found in the western hemisphere,
Mexico being the chief producer, (l) The United States
and Canada both mine silver, also the South American
countries to some extent. Silver, unlike many things,
is very hard to destroy, even through chemical use, so
the supply, with constant additions of newly mined
silver is always increasing.
1. Mexico, United States, and Canada, combined, produce
over 70%. See section on Mexico.
..
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7With these comments as a background, we are ready
to analyze the Silver Purchase Act. We shall look at
the United States and see what led her to pass the Act
and what benefits she has received through its action.
Then we shall take up the effect of high silver prices
on China, with silver as her currency; Mexico, the
chief producer; and India, the chief consumer.
.
8INTRODUCTION.
In 1929 the New York Stock market crashed, leav-
ing behind it a depressioned people. Business slowed
up or stopped and prices fell. The value of the gold
dollar rose, but the price of silver fell along with
commodity prices. On December 3, 1932, silver reached
the low of 24 per ounce. (1). The first reaction of
people in a depression is to repent, as though they had
done something wrong. The second thing they do is to
look for a way out. They reach a stage in which they
are willing to do almost anything to start business
again. A group of economists in New York started a
movement known as Technocracy. Other forms of social-
ism and communism sprang up. Among the various groups
that thought they had a cure for the depression were the
Senators from the silver mining states of the West. (2).
They believed that if the price of silver were raised,
all other troubles would be over. The price of silver
had been falling for some time and had reduced China’s
international purchasing power to nearly one-half. (3).
1. New York Times, December 3, 1932.
2. Statistical Abstract of Unit ed Stat es
,
1933, Depart-
ment of Commerce, - 1926-$. 533. 1930
—
$.282.
3. Silver mining States, - Utah, Idaho, Montana, Arizona,
Colorado and Nevada.
..
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9The silver interests thought the way to raise the price
of silver was for the government to buy large quantities
or to use its influence to create a demand for silver.
Attempts of Silver Interest to
Raise Silver Prices.
They made several suggestions. Some resolutions
were passed by Congress, only to be ignored by the
President. Among these resolutions were proposed loans
to China and plans for an International Economic Confer-
ence on silver. It was also suggested that we re-design
our silver money to make it more popular, (l) On February
20, 1931, the Senate adopted a resolution requesting
President Hoover to negotiate with foreign governments
with a view to stop silver bullion sales and melting up,
or debasement of silver coins by those governments. They
also suggested that he call a conference to discuss the
uses and status of silver as money. (2) President Hoover
refused.
The silver interests in the United States were not
discouraged. In 1933 they continued the fight with more
plans and suggestions^ many of them never getting out of the
committee. On March 9, 1933, Congress passed the Emergency
1. Leo Drew O’Neil. The New Era in Banking.
Boston University. Page 97.
2. Neil Carothers, The Senate Silver Racket. North American
Review. January 1932.
..
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Banking Act, giving the President permission to "in-
vestigate, regulate, or prohibit foreign exchange."
The Thomas amendment to the Agricultural Relief Act,
passed May 12, 1933, authorized the President "by
proclamation to fix the weight of the silver dollar
in grains nine-tenths fine at a definite fixed ratio
in relation to the gold dollar at such amounts as he
finds necessary from his investigation to stabilize
domestic prices or to protect the foreign commerce
against the adverse effect of depreciated foreign
currencies and to provide for the unlimited coinage
of such silver at the ratio so fixed", (l) It also
allowed the President to accept for a period of six
months from the date of passage, silver at a price
not to exceed 50 cents an ounce in the United States,
in payment of foreign debts, the total amount not to
exceed $200,000,000. The act also provided for the
issuance of silver certificates to equal in total the
amount of silver received from abroad. This was only
the beginning.
In May, at the International Chamber of Commerce
meeting in Washington, Senator King of Utah, attending
as an "unexpected guest", persuaded the session to
1. Leo Drew O’Neil. The New Era in Money. Page 98.
Boston University. 1934.
«*
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approve a resolution urging an international conference
on silver. None of the delegates were particularly
anxious to have the conference. Japan finally offered
to ask the Tokio Government to consider having the con-
ference, but the Japanese refused. China gave up the
idea of a silver convention.
Nevertheless, when the World Economic Conference
met in London on June 12, 1933, Key Pitmann, acting as
representative of the United States, presented a resolu-
tion on silver. It asked that the nations concerned
prevent debasement and limit arbitrary sales on world
markets. The nations were also asked to remonetize sub-
sidiary coins if it seemed advisable, and establish a
4/5 gold backing and 1/5 gold or silver for currency.
This agreement was signed on July 22, 1933.
O'Neil summarizes as follows the results of this act.
"By the terras of this pact, India, which possesses enormous
stocks of demonitized silver, agrees to limit its sales
to an average of 35,000,000 ounces annually for a period of
four years; Spain also agrees to restrict its sales to an
average of not over 5,000,000 ounces per year. China
agrees not to sell any. In return the leading silver
producing countries of the world, Mexico, United States,
Canada, Peru and Australia--covenant not to sell any
-.
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silver. They also agreed to purchase annually for mon-
etary purposes 35,000,000 ounces per year from their
mine production ". (1).
THE PRESIDENT *3 PROCLAMATION uF DECEMBER 21, 1933.
Less than six months later, on December 21, 1933, the
President of the United States issued his Proclamation
on Silver in which he says that, "In connection with
the London Agreement, by power invested in him by the
Act of May 12, 1933, and to stabilize domestic prices,
the various mints of the United States shall receive all
silver mined subsequent to the proclamation for coinage
deducting 50% as seignorage". These stocks of silver are
not to be disposed of until December 31, 1937. The Secretary
of Treasury is authorized to "provide regulations to
carry out the purpose of this proclamation". This plan
would cause the United States to purchase 24,421,410
ounces annually from domestic supply on terms equivalent
to 64t cents an ounce, this being slightly more than 20%
above the open market. (2).
The Boston Transcript summarized the advantages of
this Proclamation as described by the proponants in the
following way. First, a large increase in foreign trade
will result. Second, world silver prices will be stabil-
1. Leo Drew O’Neil- "The New Era in Money". Page 100-Boston
university.
2. National City Bank Bulletin. January 1934.
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zed at 64/ an ounce. Third, high silver prices will
increase foreign "buying power, and fourth, domestical-
ly there will "be a boost in commodity prices. Of course
they pointed out the aid to the domestic mining indus-
try. (1)
The immediate effect of the proclamation was a
rise in silver exchange both Chinese end English. (2)
The price of bar silver rose 1/2 pence and futures in
the hew York market rose to 15/ and 17/ above the day's
price. At this time, the future effects were doubtful,
but could hardly be as great as the proponants expected.
Hr. Heberts of the national City Sank, in discuss-
ing the bill, says, "as far as the supply cf money is
concerned, the purchase of 24,421,410 ounces of silver
annually, half to be coined, and half to be retained in
the Treasury, will involve the issue of only ^ 15,500,000
in new silver dollars, a negligible sum in comparison
with the total of over ^5,800, 000, COO of money in circu-
lation. lloreover, even this increase in the supply of
1, Boston Transcript, December 22, 1S55, Page 1.
2. Boston Herald, December 22, 1933.
Exchange Quotations
Opened
5.09
36. 7/8
33. 1/4
Closed
Sterling
Shanghai
Hongkong 34. 3/4
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money is unlikely to affect correspondingly, the volume
of money in circulation, for experience has shown time
and time again that money, put out in excess of the re-
quirements of trade, promptly lodges in the bank and
flows back to the Treasury as fast as it is issued"
.
Ur. Roberts continues his discussion of the effect of
this government purchasing by showing its effect on the
price of silver. "The extent to which the new plan may be
expected to affect silver prices is also highly problem-
atical. Prices to domestic producers will be raised, of
course, by some 50%. For the rest, however, prices will be
benefited only to the extent that the Treasury purchases
will relieve the market of the American domestic produc-
tion, which is a comparatively small proportion of total world
production, the round figures for 1932 being 24,000,000
ounces for the United States, against 165,000,000 for the
world total". (1). In closing his article, he adds that
while the London Agreement restricted governments, there is
nothing to prevent the private holder from selling, if the
price proved attractive. This point, though trivial at the
time, proved one of the causes for ruin in the silver market.
1. National City Bank Bulletin, January 1934, - Page 11.
.-
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On January 11, 1934, the Gold Reserve Act made
provisions, "to facilitate the acquisition of silver".
The President, in his message to Congress on May 22, 1934,
said we must, "broaden the metallic base of our monetary
system" and "stabilize the purchasing and debt paying
power of our money". He also recommended that Congress
"increase the amount of silver in our monetary stocks
with the ultimate objective of having and maintaining one-
fourth of the monetary value in silver and three-fourths
in gold". These monetary moves, especially the last one,
were decided steps ahead for the silverites, and with these
victories they were even more determined to push a bill
through Congress.
There were two bills which had been presented to the
Senate and House respectively. The Dies Bill originated
in the House and was passed by a large vote. The Senate
Bill came from the Agricultural Committee and received
the unanimous vote of that body. Both of these bills were
quite radical in their nature and had been a menace to the
newly established gold standard.
After much discussion, a bill was agreed upon which
would satisfy both the radicals and conservative interest.
One of the chief differences between the original bills
end the one as finally drafted, vias that the first bills were
mandatory and the accepted bill was at the discretion of the
President and Secretary of the Treasury.
. -
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THE SILVER PURCHASE ACT.
The Silver Purchase Act of 1934 was passed by Con-
gress on June 19, 1934. The act itself contained eight
sections and included an amendment to the Revenue Act of
1926. It re-established silver as a backing for our money
on a 4:1 ratio. Section 2 states the main objectives,
-
"It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States
that the proportion of silver to gold in the monetary stocks
of the United States, should be increased, with the ultim-
ate objective of having and maintaining one-fourth of the
monetary value of such stock in silver".
Section 3 explains that as long as the stock is less
than this, the Secretary of the Treasury is "authorized
and directed to purchase silver, at home or abroad, for
current or future delivery with any direct obligation, coin
or currency of the United States, authorized by law, or
with any fund in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated,
at such rates at such time, and upon such terms and condi-
tions as he may deem reasonable and most advantageous to
the public interest: Provided that no purchase of silver
shall be made hereunder at a price in excess of the monetary
value thereof; and Provided further, "That no purchases of
silver situated in the Continental united
..
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States on May 1, 1954, shall he made hereunder at a
price in excess of 50^ a fine ounce".
Section 4 provides for the sale ox silver "when-
ever and so long as the market price of silver exceeds
its monetary value or the monetary value of the stocks
of silver is greater than 25 per centum of the monetary
value of the stocks of gold and silver".
Section 5 deals with the issuance of certificates
hacked hy the silver purchased. It reads, "The Secre-
tary of the Treasury is authorized and directed to
issue silver certificates in such denominations as he
may from time to time prescribe in a face amount not
less than the cost of all silver purchased under the
authority of Section 3." It goes on to say that the
certificates must represent "An amount of silver in
bullion and standard silver dollars of a monetary value
equal to the face amount of such silver certificates".
These certificates are "legal tender for all debts" and
shall be redeemable on demand at the Treasury of the
United States".
Section 6 deals with the enforcement of the Act.
It gives the Secretary of Treasury authority to "in-
vestigate, regulate, or prohibit, by means oi licenses
or otherwise, the acquisition, importation, exportation,
or transportation of silver and of contracts and other

18
arrangements made with respect thereto"
•
Section 7 permits the President, whenever such
action is necessary, to effectuate the policy of this
Act by Executive order to require "The delivery to the
United States mints of any or all silver by whomever
owned or possessed" ... ’.’Provided that in no case shall
the value of the amount returned therefore be less
than the fair value at the time of such order of
silver required to be delivered as such value is
determined by the market 4 price over a reasonable period
terminating at the time of such order".
Section 8 is an amendment to the Revenue Act of
1928. (1), and places a tax on all profits received
from "transfers of any interest in silver bullion, if
the price for which such interest is, or is to be trans-
ferred, exceeds the total of the cost thereof and
allowed expenses, 50 per centum of the amount of such
excess".
The last five sections deal with the interpreta-
tion of terms used in the Act, the setting aside of $500,000
for carrying out of the Act, and the right to amend or repeal
1. Schedule A of title VIII of the Revenue Act of 1926
as amended.
..
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the act at any time. The last section repeals any pre-
vious acts not in accord with this act. (1).
COMMENTS FOLLOWING THE ACT.
Between the time this act was originally introduced
into the Congress, and the day it was passed, there was
a good deal of discussion as to its relative advantages
and disadvantages. In the National City Bank Bulletin we
find the following, "The President in his letter of trans-
mittal treats the new measure as a step toward concerted
action by all nations, or at least a large group of nations,
to establish a permanent measure of value, including both
gold and silver", for a "world standard". "To arrive at
this point", he says, "we must seek every possibility for
world agreement, although it may turn out that this nation
v^ill ultimately have to take such independent action on this
phase of the matter as its interests require".
Mr. Roberts continues, "The President is carrying out
a compromise. He wants to proceed by the orderly method
of international cooperation. Presumably he nopes that
increased purchases of silver may be gradually made with-
out disturbing the gold standard and that they will support
and raise the price of silver in world markets, thus making
the international action more feasible". (2).
1. For complete act see Appendix
2. National City Bank Bulletin, june 1934. Page 92.
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One of the first difficulties brought up by those
who opposed the silver legislation was the possible
effect it might have on the gold standard.
H. M. Fleming says, "One of the conjectures about
the meaning of the silver move is that with the gold
flow to this country slowing down, heavy silver pur-
chases by the Treasury in London would have the un-
desired effect of driving sterling up. (1).
Some believed the silver act would serve as an
"instrument of monetary warfare”. They believe that by
"raising the price of silver, Japan could be injured, as
it was so closely related to China, and purchased so many
products there, by raising the price of silver, Japan's
depreciation of the yen could be offset." The argument
was that Japan, by depreciating the yen, had been able
to dump a flood of cheap manufactured goods on our market,
and since it appeared impractical to engage in a compe-
tition of currency depreciation based on gold, the best
way to meet this situation was to deflate Japan through
a rise in the price of silver. (2).
1. Christian Science Monitor, The Week in Wall Street.
Harold M. Fleming. December 16, 1935.
2. The Silver Fiasco. Elliott V. Bell. Current nistory.
January 1936.
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They also talked of the possibility of increased
supply due to opening of mines which had been closed
when prices fell. Others feared the inflationary
effects an increased amount of currency might have.
Some even worried about the reaction it might have on
our trade. Again there were those who thought it was
just a move to help the silver mining interest.
But the silver interest knew it was a good step.
Let us look for a minute at some of the remarks made by
the silverites when discussing the possibility for im-
provement they saw in the act. On August 1, 1933
Senator Key Pittman in a broadcast from London said,
'•This will restore the purchasing power of the people
of India, China, and the rest of the Orient, who consti-
tute over one-half of the people of the world. With
this purchasing power restored, the surpluses of other
nations of the world will quickly disappear and prosper-
ity will be upon us before we can realize it. (1).
As early as January 24, 1933, Senator Wheeler had said in
speaking of the rise in silver prices that, "it would re-
store the purchasing power of 60^ of the people of the
world who live on the silver basis." (2). Sir Henri
Deterding claimed that the low price of silver is re-
sponsible for "underconsumpti on of commodi ties " because
1. Hew York Times Editorial, Hov. 10, 1935.
2. Today. April 28, 1934. Raymond Moley. Editorial.
,*
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it reduced the purchasing power of 50% of the people
of the world. On August 12, 1934, Senator V/heeler said
the reason why raising the prices of silver would, "pre-
vent manufacturers in Japan and in Chinese ports from
dumping their manufactured goods into the United States
over our tariff walls" was that it would "raise the cost
of production of competitors in silver-using countries".
Introducing his bill on April 10, Senator Thomas of
Oklahoma says raising the price of silver would "open up
the markets of silver-using countries to American export-
able products. And Raymond Moley writes in the April 28
isse of Today, "It is unfair and unintelligent to try to
laugh away the fundamental contentions of the silver advo-
cates. They say truly that silver has been and is a more
universal medium of exchange than gold. The whole Orient
and most of South America have little else with which to
buy things. When the price of silver is down, they cannot
buy our goods”. (1).
On December 22, 1933, G. F. Warren, one of the major
influences back of the bill, argues that altering silver
prices along with gold prices of any desired commodity
price level may be obtained. In his book "Prices" he
contends that it is possible to "obtain a more stable money
1. Today. April 28, 1934. Raymond Moley. Editorial.
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based on two metals instead of one”. (1)*
This is a variety of opinion from a number of people
but they all agree that a rise in the price of silver is
essential. They seem confident that the United States
silver policy will help the "Orient buy more goods from
the United States and prevent the Orient from dumping
goods on us. The combined results would do a lot to help
home industry”. This sounds very nice, but we must realize
that it is impossible to expect the Orient to buy from us
unless we buy from them.
They say very little about the help it would bring to
the mines, but they were quite conscious of the mines when
they fought for the silver policy.
When the Act was passed it was believed by some that
the Treasury would, in all probability, not do a great
deal in the near future, but we see that even before the
Act was passed, the Secretary of Treasury had started buy-
ing silver. The Boston Traveler for June 21, 1934, carries
the following article. Secretary Morgenthau today dis-
closed the Treasury was buying big quantities of silver
even before President Roosevelt signed the bill calling
for such purchases. Administration of the bill will not
be only willing, but enthusiastic, he said, explaining
that for several weeks past, extensive purciiases had been
made through the exchange stabilization fund. His state-
ment coincided with an announcement that the government’s
1. Boston Herald, December 22, 1933.
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had passed the $3,000,000,000 and exceeded the collec-
tions of the corresponding period a year ago by a clear
billion”. (1).
On June 26, a week after the bill was passed, an
Associated Press dispatch quotes Representative Dies
(Dem Tex.) co-author of the plan, as announcing that the
Treasury had already bought 70,000,000 ounces of silver.
The same dispatch says it is reported elsewhere that the
price paid for the above silver averaged 440 an ounce.
Representative Dies said as an immediate result of the
bill, the Bureau of Printing and Engraving was far behind
in printing new silver certificates, to be issued on the
basis of the metal. At 44 cents an ounce, the treasury
must issue $30,800,000 in certificates immediately . The
Treasury, according to Dies, would have to buy 1,244,000,
000 ounces of silver, "counting the silver now owned by
the government, this will give us about $2,058,000,000
of new silver certificates based on silver we must require.
This amounts to nearly one-half of the present outstand-
ing currency and means a marked currency expansion, with
a reserve backing of about ten credit dollars for each
1. Boston Herald, June 21, Page 1. 1934
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silver certificate dollar issued under this act." (1)
Hr. Roberts of the national City Rank estimated that
the Treasury must buy V 1 , 3CC , 000 , 000 worth of silver. On
April 3C, 1934, the gold in the Treasury as backing for
our monetary unit was y7, 756, 000, 000, In order to establish
a three to one ratio, we must have $2,585,000,000 of silver.
The stock of silver at that time was ^540,000,000 silver
dollars and $300,000,000 fractional coins. This leaves
vl, 745,000 ,000 to be acquired. At ”1.29 an ounce, this
would be about 1,350,000,000 ounces, (2)
This is a let of silver to buy when we consider the
world production for 1933 was 250,000,000 ounces. (3) xhe
buying of silver under the President's Proclamation of
December 21, 1933 had only a slight efiect on the foreign
silver market, but the purchase of large amounts of silver
in the world market would naturally raise the price of silver.
It rose slowly at first, but by January 1935 load reached
$.54 ' - an ounce. (4) Consequently, those who buy, sell, or
use silver to any great extent either as a commodity or as a
monetary unit, will react to this rise.
1. Poston Traveler. June 26, 1934.
2, rational City Panic Bulletin. July 1934. ^age 111.
5. Caro tiiers, ITeil Silver, A Senate Racket.
Forth American Revie'... January 1932.
4, Kandy and Harman, 20th Annual review of the Silver
Harket. 1935. Pandick Press, Inc. Few Pork 1956.
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In studying the effect of the rise in the price
of silver, due to the Silver Purchase Act, we will for
purposes of analysis, start with the United States.
We will tro.ce her actions through the months following
the adoption of this policy and interpret its reaction
on foreign trade and foreign exchange, our good will
abroad, and the country as a whole. This last item
will be broken down into various groups within the
country as the silverware manufacturers, the jewelers,
the industries using silver in the process of product-
ion, the mining industry, and the average citizen.
Then we shall consider the foreign countries as
mentioned previously. There are three we shall take
up because of the distinct types they represent.
Mexico is important because she is trie chief producer.
At the time the Act was passed she was a country on the
silver standard, so we will consider the result on her
monetary system and reaction of increased demand for
silver on general prosperity of the country and on her
import and export trade.
India, being a consumer of silver only as a commod-
ity though a very large consumer of silver, we must know
the reason for her demand and see what effect the rise
in price had on that demand.
-.
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China was the largest country still on the silver
standard in June of 1934. For this reason, this country
is perhaps the most important of the three. In order to
get a complete picture of the situation, we must under-
stand a little about the people of China and their way
of doing things. With this knowledge we will follow
her attempts, through a period of a year and a half, to
keep her balance with ever-rising unstable silver prices.
With a complete picture of the definite results
of this artificial rising in price, based on actual
facts, we will be able to determine the value of the
Silver Purchase Act of 1934, both in the United States
and abroad.
THE UNITED STATES.
Early Hist or?/.
The Silver Purchase Act of 1934 - Silver for the
United States Treasury. We must realize this is not
the first time silver has been used as part of the mon-
etary backing of the United States currency. Legally, we
have been on a gold standard only since 1900. The
first reference to the use of silver in the United States
is with the establishment of a mint in Massachusetts in 1652.
John Hull, the manager says, "Upon occasion of much
counterfeit coin brought in the country, and much loss
.?i lo
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occurring in that respect, (and that did occasion a
stoppage of trade), the General Court ordered a mint to
be set up. And they made choice of me for that employ-
ment and I chose my friend, Robert Saunderson to be my
partner, to which the court consented". (1). This mint
was subject to court order—the first being May 27, 1652
declaring that "all psons whatsoever haue liberite to
bring unto the mint house, at Boston, all bullion, plate
or Spanish Coyne, there to be melted and brought to the
alloy of sterling siluer by John Hull, Master of the
mint & his sworene officer, & by him to be coyned into
twelue pence, six pence, & three pense peeces", etc. (2).
The Court had trouble with the mint over the subject of
profit, so the Court appointed a committee to deal with
the mint. A seven year contract plan was set up. The
mint ceased operation in 1684.
The Articles of Confederation gave the United States
the power to regulate its currency. (3). The same year
Massachusetts passed an Act for the establi shment of mint
to coin gold, silver, and copper, but only copper was
coined. In the next few years several plans for a currency
1. Crosby, Early Coins of America. Page 31.
2. History of American Coinage. David K. Watson, Page 45.
3. Articles of Confederation, July 9, 1778.
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were suggested. All of them were modification of the
plan we have now. The constitution adopted in 1787,
gave Congress the right to define and coin money, and
prohibited the coinage by the States. (l). At the
first Congress, Hamilton made a report on the currency
situation. On April 2, 1792, Congress passed an act
providing for a mint, permitting free coinage, all coins
being legal tender, and setting the ratio of gold to
silver at 15:1. (2). This undervalued gold, so little
gold was brought into the mint and silver became the metal
for common use. The following year Congress passed an
act allowing the circulation of foreign coins at stated
rates of value. (3).
1. The Constitution of the United States:- Article 1,
Section 8. "The Congress shall have power, to coin
money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign
coin, - Article 1, Section 10 provides that:-
"No State shall coin Money; emit Bills of Credit;
make any thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in
payment of Debts: "
2. The Mint Act, April 2, 1792. Section 11; "That the
proportional value of gold to silver in all coins which
shaL 1 by law be current as money within the United
States, shall be as fifteen to one, according to quan-
tity in weight, of pure gold or pure silver;"
3. O'Heil—Appenda. Page 7--Act of February 9, 1793.
"Modified the existing valuations of foreign coins.
This act further provided that foreign coins, gold and
silver, were to pass current and be legal tender.
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By order of President Jefferson, in 1806, Madison
wrote the following to the Director of the Mint, "The
President directs that all the silver to be coined at
the mint shall be of small denomination so the value
of largest shall not exceed half a dollar". (1).
The agitation for a single standard started in
about 1820. Mr. Ingham, then Secretary of the Treas-
ury, studied the situation and reported that a single
standard was better and that it should be silver.
From 1829 until the passage of the Act of 1834, there
was continual discussion of the subject of a monetaiy
standard in Congress. White, a man who had once been
in favor of bimetal! sm, suddenly changed his views and
introduced the bill of 1834 for the establishment of a
mint ratio of 16:1. (2). This undervalued silver and
it was demonetized. No silver was brought to the mint and
we were practically on a single standard.
1. history of American Coinage. David K. Watson. Page 48.
2. 0 fNeil—Ap.^enda, page la--Act of June 28, 1834.-
"The first of the two acts, commonly referred to as
the gold Bill, enacted by the Congress on this date
changed the weight of the gold dollar from 24.75
grains to 25.8 grains of standard gold. The fineness
was thus altered from .916 2/3 to nearly .900. The
purpose of this act was to cause gold to circulate.
The amount of pure in the silver dollar remained un-
altered. The ratio between these two metals was,
therefore, reduced from 15 to 1, to 16.0002 to 1.
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By 1873, most of the silver dollars were out of
circulation. At that time an act was passed amending
the mint and coinage laws, but no mention was made of
silver. The progress was slow and in 1875 an act
was passed limiting the legal tender of silver coins
to ^5.00, The silver group were persistant and in 1875
a bill was passed which authorized the Secretary of the
Treasury to issue silver coins of fractional denomina-
tion and standard value to redeem fractional paper cur-
rency issued in lo62 on the disappearance of silver
coins from circulation. (1).
From that time on, silver became the question of
the day. Both parties were divided within themselves
on the matter of silver. Some of the republicans, like
Senator Morill of Vermont, believed that "no approach
could be made to genuine bimetallic currency, "both
metals freely and equally circulating without the coop-
1. Hepburn- History of Curroi cy in the United States,
Appendix Page 497. Act of January 14, 1875-- To
provide for the resumption of specie payments.
"And on and after ihe first day of January, anno
Domini, 1879, the Secretary of the Treasury shall
redeem, in coin, the United States legal tender
notes then outstanding, on their presentation for
redemption, at the office of the Assistant Treas-
urer of the United States in the City of Hew York,
in sums of not less than &50.00.
MacMillan Company, New York, 1915.
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eration of the leading commerc ial nations of the world.”
(1). They also went as far as to doubt whether it would
be possible to adjust "feeble ratios" finely enough to
prevent supply and demand from driving one metal or the
other from circulation.
Blaine believed that the Constitution required Con-
gress to make both gold and silver coins the money of the
United States. In a speech in the Senate on February 9,
1878, Blaine says, "I believe that if Germany were to
remonetize silver and the kingdoms and states of the
Latin Union were to reopen their mints, silver would at
once resume its former relation to gold. I believe the
struggle now going on in this country and in other coun-
tries for a single gold standard would, if successful,
produce widespread disaster throughout the commercial
world. The destruction of silver as money and establish-
ment of gold the sole unit of value must have a ruinous
effect on all forms of property except thos investments
which yield a fixed return in money". (2).
It became a contest between debtor and creditor.
Representative Jones of Nevada says, "Three fourths of
the homes and farms that stand in the name of the actual
occupants have been bought on time, and a very large pro-
1. Beard. Contemporary American History. Page 120.
2. Beard. Contemporary American History. Page 121.
MacMillan Company, New York, 1918.
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portion of them are mortgaged for the payment of some
part of the purchase money. Under the operation of a
shrinkage in the volume of money, this enormous mass of
borrowers, at the maturity of their respective debts,
though nominally paying no more than the amount
borrowed, with interest, are in reality, in the amount
of the principal alone, returning a percentage of value
greater than they received--more in equity than they
contracted to pay, and oftentimes more in substance
than they profited by the loan. (1)*
Finally, in 1878, the silver party forced the
passage of the Bland Allison bill in Congress. It
authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to purchase
not less than two million, nor more than four million,
dollars worth of silver to be coined into dollars. (2).
1 # Beard-Contemporary American History, P. 122.
2. O’Heil-- Appenda, Page 35- Act of February 28, 1878.
This act gave the Secretary of the Treasury author-
ity to purchase not less than v 2,000,000 worth of
silver, nor more than ^4,000,000 bullion per month
at the market price and to cause the same to be
coined monthly as fast as purchased, into silver
dollars of the weight of 412 1/2 grains troy of
standard silver, as provided in the act of
January 18, 1837. MacMillan Co. Few York, 1918.
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It was vetoed by the President and passed over his veto.
Those opposed to silver also had an act passed p?ohibit-
33
ing further retirement of legal tender notes. Also,
that the Treasury, instead of cancelling them, should
re-issue and keep them in circulation. Blaine says in
discussing the act, "The people do not want a single
gold standard, they want both gold and silver in equal
honor, in whatever abundance the bountiful earth will
yield them to the searching eye of science and to the
hard hand of labor. The two metals have existed side
by side in a hannonious
,
honorable companionship as
money ever since intelligent trade was known. (1).
The Bland-Allison Act was not satisfactory, the
ratio of silver to gold fell to 22.1 in 1887. (2).
The silver party said it wasn't the act, but the
governments appreciation of gold. The party replied
that the mints were full of coined silver. So the
silver interest passed another act in 1886 providing
for the issue of silver certificates in $1, $2, $5.
Four years later the Sherman Purchasing Act
proved another victory for the silver interests, only
to be repealed three years later. The act provided
1. Cooke—The Economic Importance of Silver. Page 8.
2. Beard-Contemporary History. Page 121. MacMillian.
3. 0 'Neil-Appenda Page 37, Act. of August 4, 1886. The
New Era in Money. Boston University 1934. The issue
of silver certificates in denominations of $1,$2, $5
was authorized. The purpose was to put more silver
into use.
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for the purchase of 4,500,000 ounces of silver monthly
and the issue of notes to be redeemable in either gold
or silver. (l), It became necessary for the Act to be
repealed in 1893, due to the departure of India from
free and unlimited coinage.
The campaign issue of 1696 was silver. Although
students of political science tell us the Issue was
deeper and really a clash between "Great wealth and
the lower midale and working classes." (2). The
republican party convention delegates voted 812-110
in favor of the platform which declared its opposition
to silver except by international agreement. The
minority in favor of silver left the convention but the
remaining elected McKinley to represent them.
The Democratic party convention was perhaps one of
the most stormy up to its time. It was at this conven-
tion that William Jennings Bryan delivered his famous
1, O' Keil-Appenda Page 38-Act of July 14, 1890.
Known as the Sherman Silver Purchase Act. Section 1,
directed the Secretary of Treasury to purchase
silver bullion to the aggregate amount of 4,500,000
ounces, or so much thereof as might be offered
each month, at the market price thereof, not exceed-
ing fyl for 371.25 grains of pure silver bullion,
treasury notes of the U. S. to be prepared by the
Secretary of Treasury in such form and of such
denominations (not less than $1 nor more than vl,000)
as he might prescribe.
2. Beard-Contemporary American History. Page 164.
? ;
.
-
* 1
t
35
speech defending bimetallism in which he concludes by
saying, "you shall not crucify mankind upon a cross
of gold”. After a fiery session, Bryan was elected
Democratic nominee for the Presidency. The campaign
was a bitter and expensive one for both parties and
ended with I cKinley victorious. The Republicans did
not push the parity act but on March 4, 1900, the act
was passed. (1). In the next fifteen years the silver
interest group was a thing of the past, however, it
came back very quickly at the time of the world war when
silver prices were high and the demand was great.
England was badly in need of silver to maintain
gold exchange standard in India. The United States had
1. Hepburn-History of Currency in the United States.
Appendix Page 498. Act of March 14, 1900—to
define and fix the standard of value to maintain the
parity of all forms of money issued or coined by
the United States to refund the public debt, and
for other purposes. ”Be it enacted, etc. that the
dollar consisting of 25 3/10 grains of gold nineteen-
tenths fine, as established by section 3511 of the
revised statutes of the United States, shall be the
standard unit of value, and all forms of money issued
or coined by the United States shall be maintained
at a parity value with this standard and it shall
be the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury to
maintain such parity".
'.
.
.
.
.
.
36
a lot of silver dollars in the Treasury which Great
Sritian offered to buy. Here was a fine chaa ce for the
United States to get rid of her surplus silver but the
Pittman Act was passed allowing the sale of not more
350,000,000 of the silver dollars at not less than one
dollar per ounce of metal. Also the Treasury must pur-
chase from the mines silver to coin into dollars at the
original sale price. So the situation arose when the
Unites States was buying silver at 65^ an ounce to go
into silver coins and $1.00 an ounce to go into dollars
to replace those sold. The cash loss was $70,000,000.
The metallic value at the time of sales was $200,000,000,
the present $60,000,000, and the difference of $140,000,
000 is an added loss. (1). We paid an obligation to the
United States and got it back for our people.
This act caused an artificial market that had to be
brought back to normal. Prices fell. Several countries
had been forced on a paper standard during the war and had
not returned to a metal standard.
As we mentioned before, in 1920 after the war crisis
Great Britain reduced the silver content of her coins.
Prance had ceased coinage of silver coins, but the excess
was taken up for a few years by Germany, Austria,
1. Cai others. Silver, A Senate Racket. North American
Review, January 1932.
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Hungary, who needed silver -to meet the demand for hard
money. In a few years the Indian government began
_
dumping silver on the market. France demonetized her
silver coins in 1928 and French Indo-China, and Siam,
in 1929 and 1931 respectively. This increased the supply
as did an increase in world production. Mexico, the
chief producer, was at peace instead of in the midst of
an internal revolution as she had been at the time of the
war.
So the world entered the depression years following
1929 with the price of silver falling. Increased supply
and decreased demand naturally forced the price down.
When the price of silver fell below 30 cents per
ounce in 1931, the silverites in the United States saw
their chance to have silver back in its own position
again. In the introduction we have traced the early at-
tempts of the silver group to legislate a silver program.
Also we hc-ve seen their victory at the London Economic
Conference, the Proclamation of the President on December
21, 1933 ordering the Secretary of Treasury to buy newly-
mined silver in the United States, and the climax of all
their efforts, the Silver Purchase Act of June 19, 1934.
Efforts to Execute the Act.
We have previously discussed the contents of this
act, but before we turn to an analysis of the effect of
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the government's silver purchases on our industry,
foreign trade, and commodity prices, let us see what
has been done by the Government since June 19, to carry
out the act and obtain its intended purpose.
On June 28, the President issued an embargo on silver
exports. This was done to prohibit speculation in
silver. "Many people expect silver prices abroad to rise
to such a point that more money can be made by selling
there uhan by taking the 50/ an ounce top price author-
ized for Treasury purchases here". The only exemption
was for silver to fill obligation assumed before the
orders were issued, silver belonging to foreign parties,
silver that had been imported for prompt export, or
silver of a fineness less than .3. (1).
The next move for silver came on August 9, 1934,
when the President issued a proclamation nationalizing
silver which read, "I, Franklin D. Roosevelt, President
of the United States, do proclaim and direct that each
United State mint shall receive lor coinage as addition
to the monetary stocks oi ohe United States, as herein-
after determined, any silver which such mint subject to
regulations presented nereunder by the Secretary of
Treasury, is sati sfied, was situated on effective date
hereof in ohe Continental United States, including the
oerr^fory of Alaska".
1. Boston Transcript, June 29, 1934.
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The Boston Transcript gave the following resume of the exec-
utive order, "Its chief purpose is to control and prevent
any further speculation in silver. By ordering that all
silver in the United States, except silver coin, and other
exempted classifications must be delivered to the Government
within ninety days, and by fixing definite terms which the
mints will pay for such delivery, the Federal Government
proposes to show hoarders or speculators in silver they have
nothing to gain by holding out for a higher price. On the
contrary, if they fail to deliver their silver within the
appointed time, they will become subject to prosecution". (1).
The terms of purchase are 50.01 per ounce. This may be com-
pared v/ith the nationalization of gold in January of the
current year.
The announcement caused suspense of open market for
silver and trading in silver futures. Wall Street expressed
the belief that the government was pursuing the policy to
satisfy the agitation for inflation. Stocks rallied after
the nationalization from 1 to 6 points. (2). On August
25th the English brokers in silver reported large profits
on the sale of silver.
1. Boston Transcript. August 9, 1934.
2. New York Times, August 9, 1934.
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In October, China negotiated with the United
States trying to pursuade them to alter the purchase
program to steady prices. Silver had been leaving
China in large quantities. The particulars of this
are discussed under China, so we will just note here
that the united States refused to give China any satis-
factory reply. China was forced to place an embargo
on silver exports.
On April 10, 1935, the Treasury announced the price of
71.11 for newly mined silver, and two weeks later the
price was raised again to 77.57 cents an ounce. The last
jump pushed the market price to 81 cents per ounce.' This
new high for silver prices had an injurious effect on the
Mexican monetary system. Although this is taken up in
the section on Mexico, - we must mention that Mexico was
forced off its silver standard. a11 coins were called in
and paper money was issued in its place. It had become
profitable to melt the coins and sell the bullion to the
United States. When the United States realized that
foreign coins were being imported and melted down, the
Secretary of Treasury, Morganthau, issued a decree prohibit-
ing except under license, the entry into united States
of foreign coins and other forms of silver used as
money. Only coins with a monetary value at the time of
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entry of at least 110% of the market value of their con-
tent, were allowed to be imported.
During the summer of 1935, the price of silver
slumped twice. On July 6, and again on August 14, the
Treasury had to buy 25,500,000 ounces to prevent further
collapse. (1). The market settled at 65 5/8$ per ounce
in August and remained constant unt il December.
Toward the end of October, the price of Chinese
exchange became very unsteady. On November 4, 1935, the
Chinese government went ofr the silver standard in
favor of a managed paper currency. This was quite a step
for China, considering the number of people using silver,
though internationally, China had been off the silver
standard since the embargo was placed on silver a little
over a year previously.
In December, the United States failed to put a
bid in at the London stock market. On Saturday, the
seventh of December, the United States was very slow
in getting in its bid, and on the following Tuesday,
December 10, 1935, the United States failed to put in
a bid at all.
1. New York Times—December 15, 1935
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The committee that usually set the current price of
silver waited all day, but still no bid. They were
finally forced to disperse without setting a price
on silver. It was the first time since 1914 that there
had not been a price determined for silver. The follow-
ing account of it appeared in the New York Times, "In
the future market at Montreal, prices broke the full
limit allowed (5 cents an ounce) on three successive
days; in New York quotations were stepped down a cent
a day; in Bombay minimum prices were fixed, and in China,
a government spokesman bitterly accused our Treasury of
making an "anti-British gesture" of which China is the
goat". (1). During the last four days of the week, the
Treasury bought small amounts of silver in London at
successively reduced prices. The market had broken and
in a few weeks was down to 440 an ounce, the price level
of December 10, 1935. (2).
Mr. Morganthau said, when asked about the future
policy of the United States Treasury, - that the purchase
of silver would continue, although he admitted it would
be less concentrated.
1. The New York Times, December 15, 1935.
2. See silver prices in Appendix.
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In discussing the subject of the governments with-
drawal from the London market, the question arises, Where
is the United States going to get its silver? The Christian
Science Monitor says, ’’Doubtless the source is China, where
the Chinese government is disposing of its nationalized
hoard by private treaty. Neither will admit it: as an active
trader in the metal the United States Treasury must disguise
its operations. China’s secrecy is due to the fact that It is
parting with a metal that 400,000,000 Chinese people cherish.”
Whether this is true is hard to say, but it is the general
opinion that the government is continuing its buying.
If we view graphically the rise and fall of silver prices,
we see that they were forced up by the belief that the United
States was going to push the price to $1.29 an ounce. In the
spring of 1935 each rise in the government price of silver
resulted in a corresponding rise in the market price, but
confidence failed and the market price fell. (2)
From this brief history of the act we can see it has not
had any permanent effect on the price of silver. However,
this artificial flight of silver prices up and down, in the
relatively short period of two years, must have had some
effect on the silver mining industry and perhaps even on the
country as a whole. The extreme nature of the case merits an
investigation.
1. Christian Science Monitor. December 16, 1935.
2. See graph on next page.
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Tlie Silver ’.lining Industry
The silver mining industry is perhaps the first
place we should look for the effects of the rise in
prices. In the Boston Transcript, four days after the
government started Buying newly -mined silver, we find
the following caption, "Spurt of Activity at ITevada
Hines", The article reads, "In a hundred camps there
is activity today such as ITevada has not known since
Jim Butler’s runaway "burros led him to the rich silver
deposit at Tonopah and started the wild series of
events climaxed by the discovery of Goldfield, nothing
like a boom is apparent, but orderly preparations are
under way to reopen abandon silver properties and devel
op huge ore bodies, (1)
The United States mines produce about one-fourth
of the world’s supply of silver, the amount having de-
creased in the last thirty years prior to the passage
of the Silver Purchase Act,
Hine production of silver in the United States
as compared with the world,
(Ounces)
Year World U. S. Percent of Total
1900-4 168.0 Mil. 56,1 Mil, 33.3#-
1905-9 188.1 " 55.2 " 29 .o%
1910-5 285.5 » 64.1 " 22.5^
1. Boston Transcript, December 26, 1933.
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1915-9
1920-4
1925-9
208.1
254.0
254.0
45
69.1 Mil.Oz. 37.3%
60.6 " 29.1%
61.8 » 24 . o/o (:l)
This chart shows that except for the war period, the
United States production has been steadily downward. In
1934 the first year after the government started buying,
we produced 26.4 million ounces. The next year, our out-
put increased to 38.4 million ounces although the world
production had increased only from 185.4 million to
206.4 million.
Our silver production is mainly a by-product of
copper and lead. When high prices of silver cause a
demand for that metal we tend to have copper and lead
in excess which is a detriment to market for these metals.
Without going into a study of the various types of ores,
we can see that silver contributes a comparatively small
amount of the revenue received by the mining industry.
Us Total production $ % of revenue
Lead 459.0 23.2 5.1
Copper 79.8 10.0 12.5
Silver 301.2 8. 2.7
Gold 41.9 .9 2.1 (2)
1* Leong, Silver, An Analysis of Factors affects its
price, Page 35.
2. Leong, Silver, An Analysis of Factors affects its
price, Page 64. Brookings Institute, Washington ,D. C.
Institute of Economic Publication.
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7/hile it is true that in recent years the United
States has produced about 1/4 of the silver of the
world, let us look at the relative importance of silver
mining and manufacturing in relation to other mineral
products and other lines of manufacturing.
In the mining of silver as it is a by-product, the
computation of the number employed is only a matter of
estimate. The Statistical Abstract gives the number of
people engaged in the extraction of minerals as 2% of
those gainfully employed. Of this 2% less than lit are
engaged in the extraction of silver and gold ore, that is
.4$ of 1^. (1) In response to those who thought that an
improvement in silver prices would put a lot of people
back to work, we must say that they were probably right,
but that in proportion, the number is relatively small
compered with those unemployed in other lines of business.
When we come to the manufacture of silver, the
Biennial Census of Manufacture for 1931 gives those employ-
ed in the smelting and refining of gold, silver, and alloys
of these as $03. This is infinitesimal when we realize
there are 6 r523,026 wage earners in all manufacturing in-
dustries. Of course, there are other forms of manufactur-
which are directly affected by the price of silver.
The silverware and plated ware manufacturers, as an in-
dustry are rated 109 by the number of people employed
1. Statistical Abstract, 1935* No. 57-
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and 145 by the value of the products manufactured
1931 Value of Product No. Wage Earners
Silverware and
Plated ware
All Industires
45,814,831
$41,350,464,564
11,077
6,525,026
1929
Silverware 30,452 5,007 (1)
Industrial Uses of Silver.
From the above analysis we see that silver is as
a commodity relatively unimportant. World values, with
wheat as 100, rate silver as 2.93, rubber as 12, and
cotton as 53.6. (2) As an industry, silver rates below
the peanut industry according to Carothers. (3)
There has been a great deal of speculating as to
the future effect of silver price rise, but if it drops
very low, as a reaction to a high price, all these mines
will be closed and the miners will be no better off.
They are already voicing their discontent. (4) "Condem-
nation has ben based on the grounds that although
miners are being offered approximately 77 cents an ounce
for their newly-mined silver, the Government appears
to prefer to gamble on the world market and buy silver
1. Biennial Census of Manufactures for 1931, United States
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 1935.
2. Lawrence, J.S. The Unimportance of Silver.
World’s ’Work. August 1931.
3. Carothers, Silver, A Senate Racket. North American
Review, January 1932.
4. The Christian Science Monitor, December 13, 1935.
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at around 60 cents; that with the rise in the price of
silver, the price of other metals which are mined in
association with it have not been proportionately-
raised to afford much profit; and that the Government
has made an ill gesture by its 50 per cent seigniorage
charge of all silver entered at the mints for coinage.
Charles Henderson, head of the Denver office of
the United States Bureau of Mines says, "Great
advances in silver mining cannot be expected until the
price of lead, zinc, and copper which are mined with
silver, can be raised to such an extent that it will
be profitable for the miner. Very little pure silver
is being mined and unless the base ores found in associa-
tion can be sold at good prices, mine operators will be
losing.
”
In considering the industrial uses of silver, we
find there are three main fields namely sterling ware,
electro-plating, and photography. As to the relative
importance, we find the following true since 1928.
Sterling ware industry 37%
Photographing 35%
Electro plating 15% (l)
A year by year study shows that there is a falling off
of sterling ware and photographing in 1931 when quantity
is considered, but an increase by percentage.
1. Leong, Silver, An Analysis of factors effecting its
price. Brookings Institute. Washington D.C. 1935.
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If we consider the effect of price on the amount
of each of these, we will find that sterling ware business
tends to increase with lower silver prices--but not to
any great extent. The electro-plating industry is the
more sensitive, decreasing a great deal with the silver
price decrease.
The Photographing industry might easily be desig-
nated as a branch of the Chemical industry. One of the
chief chemicals made from silver, is silver nitrate,
and Q0% of the silver nitrate made is used by the photo-
graphing industry. If we will look at the price, we can
easily see what a problem it wauld prove to the motion
picture industry where there is a constant demand for
silver nitrate. (1). A study made by Leong shows that
the rise in the production of this metallic chemical
is paralleled by the motion picture industry.
We do not v/onder that the electro-plating industry
was stimulated by the increase in silver prices if we
look at the market increase in the price of sterling. (2).
The 20th Annual Review of the Silver market of
1935
—
put out by Handy and Harman gives us the follow-
ing account, of the industrial situation. "Vie estimate
1. See Appendix
2. See Appendix
'.
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that 25,500,000 ounces of silver were absorbed during
1935 by the arts and industries in the United States and
Canada, about 1,500,000 ounces less than in previous
years. The use of silver in the manufacture of sterling
silverware declined some 15$ below 1934, but there was
an increase of 5$ in consumption for both silver plated
7/are and lor chemical purposes and motion picture film.
Tne amount employed by the dental industry remained
practically unchanged, whereas the requirements of the
jewelry trade showed a gain of about 10$".
However, Handy and Harman believe that the stabil-
ity of the local market was due to the buying of the
jevrelers, so that perhaps jewelers might have bought
more than they have used. In which case, this increase
might not be justified. Continuing, "Hew uses for
silver in industry, including the electrical field
accounted for some increase in consumption cser 19 34, and
further progress will undoubtedly be made as business
continues to improve,"
"We are informed that England used about 1C,CC0,000
ounces in the arts and industries during 1935. The
decline from the previous year’s estimates of 13,00C,0C0
ounces is Decause the latter figure is reported to have
included some speculative purchases made by the trs.de
t !
.
*
.
.
51
during 1934, probably in expectation of higher prices.
As in the past, we have been unable to secure any seg-
regation of date to indicate Germany's purely industrial
consumption of silver. Furthermore, at the present time
we are lacking up to date statistics of any sort from
that country, and therefore, we have been obliged to use
the 1934 figures as our only basis for Germany's 1935
silver consumption. We estimate the amount at 12,000,000
ounces”. (1).
The sudden jump in price of bar silver had been hard
on the silverware and jewelry manufacturers using silver
as a raw material. They tried to secure an amendment to
the silver purchase act allowing them to buy silver at a
special lower price for use in production, but all their
efforts were useless. Now they are in a very bad position.
They must have silver, but they don't know whether to cut
their prices or push them up. Within a month, the price of
silver dropped 20#, or nearly a third. The government
actions will determine the price of silver and it is impossible
to know what the government is planning.
The Business Week for June 1, 1935 carries an article
listing four complaints of the silver ware dealers of the
United States.
1. Review of the Silver Market for 1935. Handy and Harmon
Pandick Press, Inc. Fage 30-31.
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1. Silverware prices have been forced up faster
than consumer's ability to pay.
2. Plated ware and other products are substituted for
sterling.
3. Manufacturers have to lay off workers, which adds
to unemployment.
4. Old time reliable jewelers have lost sales. (1).
In looking at these accusations, we will have to
admit that all of them are justified. The third, in
regard to unemployment, - is perhaps of little value,
for there would have been a certain amount of unemploy-
ment regardless of silver prices. However, we must
agree what the silver purchase act has been hard on
these who used silver in their business- whether directly
as in the silverware industry, or indirectly, as in the
motion picture industry.
Along this line, we see that there has been a great
introduction of substitutes. Bronze and glass ha,ve sub-
stituted silver jewelry. Chromium and various monel
-
metals have replaced silver for metal household equip-
ment.
GOODWILL
When we come to those indirectly touched by the
price of silver --we must consider our government. Y/hat
1. Business Y/eek. June 15, 1935* Page 22
.»
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effect has the rise in the price of silver had to do
with its welfare? If we think a minute we will realize
that our pushing up the price of silver has had a marked
effect on those concerned with silver. If the effect
has been good, those who use silver will be pleased; if
it has not, our good will has been hampered. In the case
of Mexico, although the rise in the price of silver forced
her off her monetary standard as we shall see later, the
rise in the price of silver caused a period of marked pros-
perity for Mexico is a silver producing country. Consequent-
ly, there is no ill feeling between the United States and
Mexico at the present time.
Hoy/ever, the actions of the United States caused
consternation in Western Europe. There was considerable
speculation as to the effect of silver purchases on the
pound sterling. But whatever the result in the West
,
we
must realize that the effect on the Far East is much greater,
for China, at the begining of our purchasing policy was on
the silver standard, silver actually circulated as money.
Leonard T. K. Wu in the Far East Survey has referred to our
program as "ruthlessly adhering to a program in the face of
the opposition of practically every monetary expert in
China". (1).
1. Bulletin of Foreign Commerce, October 1932. Article 35
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On May 21, 19 55 there were ten countries whose
coins were more valuable as bullion than as money. They
were Bolivia, Chili, China, Costa Rica, Columbia, hong-
kong, Mexico, Peru, Salvador, and Uruguay. (1). The
United States is a strong and powerful country, but no
country can afrord to have the ill will of too many
countri es.
The New Leader, an organ of the Independent Labor
Party in England, calls the silver purchasing act, "worse
than an earthquake". It claims that silver has ruined
British commercial interest in China, and threatened the
stability of India. (2).
FOREIGN TRADE
Cn the subject of foreign trade, both import and
export of goods, we will remember that among the things
the silverites promised of the silver purchase act—was
the improvement of commerce conditions in the Far East.
They said higher silver prices would keep out cheap
Chinese and Japanese goods, but would increase their pur-
chasing power from us through an appreciation of their
money unit. Let us look at the government statistics and
see what has happened in the last four years.
1. Commercial and Financial Chronicle -Volume 140. May ^5,
1935. Page 3473.
2. Living Age. July 25, 1935. As others see us.—The
Silver Racket, quoting the London economist. Page 466.
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CHINESE TRADE
(Ten Month Period from Jan. 1. to Oct. 1.)
Imports
.
Exports
1932
1933
1934
1935
48,538,566
31,352,942
37,723,998
52,180,769
21,691,614
37 ,677 ,025
60,540,944
31,667,385 (1)
As indicated, these figures are for the first ten
months of the respective years. At a glance they
reveal that our imports from China have steadily in-
creased during the four years so that in 1935, they had
more than doubled the figure for 1932. We seem to be
still buying from China, but we don’t sell more. We
did in 1934. The slight rise in the price of silver
apparently helped China, for she bought 60 million
dollars worth of goods from us, but by the next year,
the tables had completely turned. We owed a balance
to China as great as the one she owed us the year
before. Hot only have we lost our favorable balance
of trade with China, but we have put China in a state of
financial chaos that completely bound her as far as
trade was concerned, both internally and externally.
The Business Week for November 9, in discussing our
foreign trade, says only two of our ten largest custom-
ers increased their business with us spectacularly this
1. Bulletin of Foreign Commerce, October 1934, Article 35
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year -Cuba and Mexico. In 1955, China dropped to almost
one -half the level at which they stood in 1954, being com-
pletely off the big ten list. The silver drain and the
unsettlement in the Par Eastern business is blajned. (1).
Eminent Chinese bankers realized that the arguments
of the silverites were false. Mr. li Ming, Chairman of
the Bank of China and of the Chekiang Industrial Bank
while visiting the United States in Sept. 1954, said,
"The theory that, by raising the price of silver, China
would be able to buy more in America, or America would
be able to sell more to China, is not economically
sound. The effect, if any, would be very short-lived,
as China could not afford to pay for American imports
of commodities with exports of silver beca.use she needs
all the silver she has for her medium of exchange.
America’s purchasing power is not measured by the
gold you possess, but is measured by the productivity
of your national wealth. China, like every other country
pays for her imports chiefly by her exports. The silver
in his posession, no matter how big that amount, may be
1. Business week, ITov. 9, 1955. Foreign Trade Panorama.
Page 25.
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does not help much in her purchase abroad. She will
have to depend upon her exports and her exports alone".
Mexico, our chief silver producer, has benefited
by the rise in silver prices so that she is enjoying
a je riod of prosperity. For this reason, she is doing
considerable constructive work--which calls for mater-
ials from the United States and thus increases our
export v/ith her. Quoting the Business Week, "There is
no new trade agreement with Mexico yet, but cur large
purchases of silver at the new high prices have brought
prosperity to the Mexicans. With a big road building
program requiring modern grading and paving machinery,
the Mexicans are spending freely in this market. Only
six countries bought more in the United States than
Mexico in the first three quarters of this year.'' (1).
When we consider the size of Mexico, this is a surpris-
ing statement.
Imports and Exports to Mexico. ( 2 ).
1932 33,318,596 <r8, 583 , 566
1933 25,116,620 37,677,025
1934 30,648,440 46,345,598
1935 34,762,370 54,198,333
The Business Week, November 9, 1935. Foreign Trade
Fanorama. Page 22.
2. National City Bank Bulletin, October 1932 and Oct.
1935. Department of Commerce, Government Printing
Office, Washington, D. C.
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Since we are considering India in our discussion
of the question, let us look briefly at her export and
import trade with us.
These figures are interesting but not of vital importance
in this case as India is not on a silver standard.
In summarizing, it will have to be agreed that the
silver policy may have helped Mexico because she is a
producer, silver is her commodity for the world market
so a high price is always good news. However to those
countries who used silver as a monetary unit, high prices
of silver made little difference as far as giving them
foreign purchasing power, and when it threw them off
their standard, it disrupted commerce and cut down the
trade they did have.
At the National Foreign Trade Covent ion held in
Huston, Texas on November 1$, 1935, we find the American
exporters are quite concerned over the effect of the
silver purchase policy on foreign trade, especially those
who trade considerably with the Far East. The tobacco
trade was damaged more perhaps than others. Their trade
declined in one year from $3 million pounds to £5 million.
(1) This decline was due in part to the poor exchange
conditions caused by the silver situation in China.
1. Final Declarations of the 22nd National Foreign Trade
Convention. Huston, Texas. Page 9*
Year
Imports and Exports to India
From the United States
Jan. 1 to Oct. 1.
Imports
27. 735.504 20
.
344,941
Exports
1932.
.:
.
»
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This caused them to feel that the act was not only
"against our interest, but destructive of good will in
China toward the United States 11 , (l)
Along with foreign trade, we might consider the
reaction in foreign exchange. Of course China ! s for-
eign exchange has been a matter of guess-work since she
placed the embargo on silver in October 1934. (2)
Foreign Exchange
Chinese Dollar
1929 41.9007
1930 29.9166
1931 22.4369
1932 21.7357
1933 28.5979
1934 34.0937
1935 36.5707
1936 34.2164
1935 January 34.9924
February 36.5369
March 38.2960
April 38.7908
May 41.0979
June 40.4002
July 38.6791
August 36.8645
September 37.6226
October 35.6091
November 29.6435
December 29.4496
Since China has nationalized silver, Chinese
exchange has remained low and unsteady, although the
government is trying to keep it fairly stable.
In November, after the Chinese government national-
ized silver, the New York Times expressed the
1. Elliston. Silver, East and West. Foreign Affairs.
July 1935.
2. Survey of Current Business. January 1936. Page 32.
'.
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following with regard to Chinese trade, "All foreign
traders agreed that the Chinese situation resolved
itself into a question of exchange, hut many exporters
and importers said they would limit themselves to spot
dealings until more definite predictions concerning
the Chinese currency are possible." (1).
The purchase of large amounts of silver has, in
London, made the dollar cheap and the sterling high in
the United States. On February 8, 1935, sterling was
selling in Hew York for §5.01j-. (2).
The Foreign Trade Council of the United States,
realized that without monetary systems and stable for-
eign exchange rates, there can be no revival of world
tra-e on a normal basis. They go on record in the
Final Declaration of their convention, "One essential
step toward world recovery-only to be attained follow-
ing at least a partial re-establishment of sound in-
dustrial activity--is the return to a sound and proven
monetary system and the abandonment of further monetary
experiments". Among the fourth specific measures it
listed was, "Repeal of such laws as may require the fur-
ther purchase oi Silver for monetary purposes", (o).
1. Hew York Times, Hov. 10, 1935.
2. " " " Feb. 9, 1936 0
3 * Final Declarations of the National Foreign Trade
Council Convention, Houston, Texas, November 18, 1935.
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Effect on U. S. Currency.
As for the worries people held about the effect
of our silver purchasing policy on the gold standard,
this addition of silver has undoubtedly weakened our
monetary base.
In a chart showing the Treasury* s statement for
a period of years, we find that the addition of silver
as expected under the act, reduces the ratio of gold
to all currency from 112.6 to 92.6. Mr. Roberts, of
the National City Banks says, in discussing the change
in our base, "It seems appropriate to consider the
Treasury and Reserve banks as a central banking insti-
tution, similar to all of the central banks of the
world, which by a process of evolution, have been de-
veloped to supply the currencies of the respective
countries and to hold the final reserve of the bank-
ing systems. Considering the Reserve banks as branches
of the Treasury, the reserve deposits should be added to
complete the comparison. These deposits, at the end of
April were $3,993,000,000 which added to the credit
currency, $8,372,000,000 gives a total of $12,365,900,000
against which the gold holdings of $7,756,000,000 give
a ratio of 62.7$". (l)
1. National City Bank Bulletin. June 1934. Page 95.
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U. S. TREASURY CHART ON BASIS OF CURRENCY.
Year Gold Coin Silver
and bullion
1880 June 30
1890
1900 1
1910 1
1920 2
1930 4
1934 Jan. 4
1934 Apr. 7
#1934 Apr. 7
352 70
686 380
034 566
636 568
865 269
535 540
036 540
756 540
756 2,585
All credit currency Ratio of Gold to
all credit currency
770
1,044
1,424
2,431
5,527
4,825
6,406
6,327
8,372
45.7
66.7
72.6
67.3
51.8
94.0
63.0
122.6
92.6 (1).
# Calculated to show statistical effect of increasing
silver up to 25$ of total gold and silver reserve,
other things being the same.
There are those who believe that the pr esent
ratio of gold is unnatural and as soon as economic
conditions right themselves again, gold will be drained
out of the United States, at which time silver will do
us little good.
1 National City Bank Bulletin June 1934 x'age 94
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The silver currency has back of it silver which
is worth about 1/3 of the value of the paper. In all
probability it would be impossible to sell this
silver at any price in case of emergency.
"With gold as the standard of value, it is
always to be borne in mind that silver bullion is a
Treasury Asset only in the sense that iron or cord
wood might be, except that there would be a possibil-
ity of selling the latter while the sale of silver
is never to be thought of. The only way the Treasury
can ever realize anything on its silver holdings is to
coin them into money". (1).
For practical purposes we may as well consider
these silver certificates credit money. When we real-
ize this it seems incredible that the United States
should spend so much money.
As far as the effect on the present depression-
the inflationary effect which some expected, would come
from increased currency through the issue of silver
1
.
National City Sank Bulletin. Jan. 1934. Page 11.
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,
,
64
certificates was negligible. In proportion to the
total amount of currency, this addition was only a
drop in the bucket. It is an accepted fact that no
matter how much currency is put into circulation,
the excess will find its way back into the banks.
In summarizing the results of our policy on
United States, our good will and export trade with
Mexico have been built up, while good will and trade
with China have been broken down. The rise in the
price of silver has been beneficial to the miners of
silver, but they are not satisfied.
Our industries using silver as a metal have
felt the effect of unstabilized raw material in pro-
duction. The inflationary effect has been negligible,
except to weaken our monetary structure.

65
CHINA
Early History
We will take up a study of China, the chief
large country on the silver standard when the United
States started its manipulations of the silver market.
Let us consider here the early history of these
people who for over 1,300 years have used silver as a
medium of exchange, store of wealth, and measure of
value.
The Chinese unit of silver currency has been the
liang or Chinese ounce, 16 of which equal a "chin” or
"catty”, 1 1/3 pounds avoirdupois. The liang is not
a coin but a unit of weight known to outsiders as the
"tael". (1). For use, silver bullion was cast into
ingots in the shape of a Chinese shoe. The money was
distinguishable from the commodity only by the stamps
of fineness. The weight of the ingots was determined
by scales, and as the scales in the various communities
differed, the ingots were not uniform; the approximate
weight was fifty ounces.
In Southern China, silver dollars were accepted
only on their intrinsic value. Shops accepting them
would chop or stamp them as a guarantee, hence they were
1. China, A Commercial and Industrial Handbook. Page 154.
Department of Commerce, Trade Promotion Series. Govern-
ment Printing Office, Washington, D. C. 1936.
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called "chopped dollars". The shops were careful in
determining the weight and fineness of the dollars
they stamped so they could stand behind them. For
custom payments, the foreign powers stipulated by
t
treaty a custom tael known as the haikwan. The
haikwan equals 581-9 grains 1,U00, the conversion
rate l/8 to 1/2 of 1%, being paid out of that received.
( 1 ).
Toward the end of the Eighteenth century the
Spanish Carolus dollars came into China from the
Phillipine Islands and became current in Sino-foreign
transactions. In Canton, and later in other Southern
Chinese ports this was also done. This entry of
foreign currency continued and during the nineteenth
century ten to fifteen different kinds were in circula-
tion. The American dollar, because of its superior
silver content, was hoarded and melted down. The
Mexican dollar was the most generally used.
As early as 1792, the Emperor Ch’ien Lung ordered
the minting of silver dollars in Tibet. These coins
were short-lived. In the next hundred years there were
1. China, A Commercial and Industrial Handbook.
Page 154.
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various attempts at minting by the provinces. In
1892 the first government attempt was started, but
relatively few dollars were coined, (l). The first
serious attempt at a legal standard was made with the
establishment of the Republican dollar or Yuan in 1914,
During the world war the price of silver rose so high
rhat silver dollars were melted down. ( 2 ).
In 1924 the Chinese Bankers Association at a con-
ference: undertook to underwrite a loan of £>3 , 000,000
for a new mint patterned after the one in Washington,
with the salt surplus and the mint as collateral. The
mint was then under construction, £> 2 , 500,000 already
having been loaned by these same banks. The Minister
of Finance promised this group full power to manage, if
they accepted xhe loan. Civil war prohibited further
action. (3).
The xael is gradually being replaced by the silver
coin. In Canton the small silver coins and in Hongkong
silver dollars are current. The government uses silver
for all purposes and the banks of Peking carry their
1. Kann estimates 290 million dollars in 1891-1914 and
1,300 mil. Republican dollar from 1914-1930. Lecng
Silver. An Analysis of Pact.
2. Tne Yuan is silver and 11% copper alloy or 370
grains pure silver.
3. China. A Commercxal and Industrial Handbook. P. 164.
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accounts in dollars. However, many foregin companies
find it most convenient to carry two accounts, one in
taels, and the other in dollars.
Period from 1929-193^.
There was in China in 192-9 a large amount of silver.
The Chinese v/ere not great consumers of silver -until after
191$, "but from 191$ to 1931, 1,000,000,000 ounces of
silver were imported which represented 30% of the world r s
production in that time. (1)
YIe mustn’t overlook the fact that there was at the
time of the depression a great deal of foreign capital
already in China. The price of silver was low, conse-
quently it didn’t pay to export the metal or to buy
exchange, so this capital stayed in the coastal cities.
Another reason for the accumulation of funds in the
seaport cities was the movement of funds from Bombay
by Sassoon interests in order to avoid political un-
rest.
At this time the world was entering a depression.
In the first years of this depression China was in a
rather peculiar position. The price of silver had
fallen very low, consequently it was hard for China
to import goods from abroad as it took a great deal
1. Carothers, Neil, Silver, A Senate Racket. Page $.
North American Review, January 1932*
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of silver to pay for them. Because of the large amount
required to pay foreign debts, there 'was a natural with-
drawal of silver from the interior. Under normal con-
ditions Chinese exports would have offset in part the
foreign debt, but the world was in a depression and the
demand for Chinese goods had fallen off. The Chinese,
however, had a competitive advantage which increased her
exports to some extent. Silver prices had fallen with
commodity prices and as a result there was no reduction
in the price level in China.
Price Drops during 1930-1931* (1)
Silver ^9 Sugar 39.0$
'/heat 3b
. 0$ Copper ^0.0$
Cotton 4-6.6$ Coffee c 66 .6$
Rubber 66.0$ Average of all products 51*1$
It might be well to stop and differentiate between
the industry found in the coastal cities, and the trade
that goes on in the interior. Naturally, the coastal
cities, due to the foreign influence, are more developed
than the inland areas. In the farming districts, many of
the farmers rent their land and pay their rent in pro-
duce. They live on their crops and have little need for
money except to provide their simple clothing. In pros-
perous times, capital flows inward, as an investment in
1. Lawrence, J. S. The Unimportance of Silver.
World’s Work. April 1931*
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in inland inprovements as irrigation ditches, roads,
railroads, etc. When money becomes scarce it is drawn
back to the seaports. People lose confidence and do
not re-invest when rheir money is liquidated.
leavens, in discussing this return of silver from
the interior, in 1929, says it reflected three things :-
1. Falling commodity prices end decrease export demand
for Chinese Agricultural products.
2. Flight of capital for regions upset by civil war.
3. Increases use of bank notes, (Silver used as back-
ing for bank notes--60$ required). (1).
Sir Arthur Salter enlarges upon this and says: -
1. Conditions of interior trade.
2. Insecurity of interior made landlords, etc. prefer
banks to interior investments.
3. Reduction of trade and fall in prices lesses demand.
4. Restriction of credit as borrowers less able provide
credit.
5. Closing down and reduction of intermediate merchants.
6. hew capital didn't seek interior due to lack of
security.
7. High rate government pays for its financing now
amounting to 10/£ which makes no attraction for money
elsewhere
.
8. Adverse balance of trade. (2).
Another situation must be considered. China '
3
material exports have always been less than her material
imports. But this difference has been cared for by an
1. Leavens. American Silver Policy in China.
2. Sir Arthur Salter. Page 48. China and Silver. The
Economic Forum, Inc. New York, 1934.
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invisible item in ihe trade made up of remittance from
abroad and foreign capital seeking a field for invest-
ment. Of course, with the foreign world in a depression
no one was making money to send home to China, and
those who have money to invest,- a much smaller number
than in good times, - are not investing it.
However, there was a lot of foreign capital in
China in 1929, .and the low price of silver made it un-
profitable to take it out. Adding this amount to that
which had come from internal China, we find an increas-
ing amount accumulating in the Shanghai banks.
Silver Stocks in Shanghai Banks- Note Issue
In Circulation.
Dec. 1931
1931
1932
1933
U).
375.000.
000
250.000.
000
356.000.
000
503.000.
000
250.000.
000
275.000.
000
287 , 0C0 ,000
353.000.
000
Some of this silver was used as backing for bank
notes in circulation. There is some increase in xhe note
issue--but not as great an increase as there might have
been. If they had increased the note circulation as
fast as the law would jb rmit, they could have created
1. Leong. Factors affecting the price of silver. P. 35.
Brookings Institute, Washington, D. C. Institute of
Economic Publications, 1934.
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422 million in notes from 1931 to 1933 instead of
the seventy-eight million created. The strangeness to
people of paper, is one of the fears held for China
under the managed currency which she was forced to
adopt. We shall consider this more in detail later.
The presence of this excess reserve brought signs
of prosperity in many of the Coastal cities during
1931. In Shanghai there was quite a real estate boom.
Many of the banks had excess reserves and invested them
in real estate. When conditions became bad, the banks
were unable to sell, and with a large amount of frozen
assets which had lost value since purchase, they were
forced to close their doors. The American papers
carried several notices of these failure, for example :-
"AMERICAN-ORIENTAL BANK AT SHANGHAI IN TROUBLE. Direc-
tors of the American-Oriental Banking Corporation, at
a meeting today, decided to suspend payments and apply
to the United States Court for appointment of trustees
to conserve assets for the benefit of depositors”.
It was reported that the bank’s assets were sub-
stantially in excess of liabilities and that a shortage
of cash was caused only by the continued acute financial
situation in the Orient”. (1).
1. The Detroit News. May 29, 1935.
..
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"ANOTHER SHANGHAI SANK EORCED TO CLOSE DOORS. As a
result of the acute financial situation in China,
the Shanghai Tmgsun Native Bank, of xhe largest style
Chinese hanks, closed its doors today.
The Tingsun bank is the third financial house to
collapse during the last week, the others having been
the .American Oriental Bank and the Hinghua Commercial
Savings Bank. (Officials of the .American Oriental
Bank blamed their difficulties on the American Govern-
ment’s silver purchasing policy". (l).
Another stimulus to industry was the duty charges
and low exchange rates which made it more profitable
to produce products which nad iormerly been imported.
But to retrace, China’s period of prosperity was
brought to a sharp close when Grea<. Britain, on Sept.
21, 1931, went on the gold standard. This caused the
pound o o depreciate and resulted in an appreciation of
xhe silver currency. So China lost her advantage in
foreign trade, and was in bhe same position as the rest
I
of the world. Her money had appreciated which is the
same relatively as a fall in the price level.
1. Detroit Eree Press. May 24, 1935.
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The United States saw that China was having trouble,
so engineered the silver agreement at the London Economic
Conference, and finally launched on a world wide purchase
of silver to boost silver prices.
1934-REACTION TO RISE IN SILVER.
Not long after the Silver Purchase program started,
reports came that China was losing silver in large quanti-
ties. By September, the Chinese government was greatly
worried for a loss of silver means a loss of currency, as
silver circulated. They sent a note to the United States
requesting them to withdraw from the market enough to let
the price of silver remain stable. They agreed to exchange
silver for gold with the United States. The note very
clearly summed up the Chinese situation. This note read
in part as follows:- "Since 1931, the rising of silver
value in terras of foreign currency has involved severe
deflation and economic losses to China and has dislocated
China’s balance of payments, in part at least, by hampering
exports. Recently the stimulation of silver prices abroad,
to which exchange has not fully responded, has caused serious
drain of silver, creating great alarm.
Silver exports of this year to date are over three times
greater than any previous full year. Further material silver
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price increase would cause very serious injury to China,
possibly severe panics. Although influential American
circles advocate higher silver prices, the Chinese Govern-
ment, of course, makes no assumption concerning the American
policy in this regard.
China is certain that the American Government desires
to avoid any action that may aggravate present conditions
and therefore would appreciate an assurance that the
American Government would refrain from any action that
might cause a continuation of the present silver drain from
China, and, accordingly, would cooperate to prevent fur-
ther rise and to maintain the stability of silver which the
London agreement contemplates. Indeed, from China f s view-
point, the stabilized level should be somewhat lower than
the present price.
The National Government feels obliged actively to
seek means of avoiding further hardships of silver fluctua-
tion. It considers that China should not alone maintain
the silver standard and is considering the gradual intro-
duction of a gold basis currency, which will necessitate
the acquiring of gold.
Since the American Government desires an increased
proportion of silver in its monetary reserve, the National
Government desires also to ascertain in principle whether
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The American Government is willing to exchange with the
Chinese Government gold for silver." ( X )
•
Mr. H. H. Kung, finance minister of the National
Government, in a second note, tried to emphasize the sit-
uation and explained that China was not "protesting"
President Roosevelt's policy, hut only wanted an exchange
of views.
The United States Government, through its Secretary
of State, Cordell Hull, replied that it was impossible
to stop purchases, but they would try to avoid disturb-
ance to Chinese economy. He also said that it was impossi-
ble to exchange silver for gold because, "free markets in
which gold and silver could be acquired by purchase are
now open to all nations, and therefore, direct inter-gov-
ernmental transactions have not been undertaken".
The Chinese Government saw that it was hopeless to
try and stop the United States purchasing, - so they tried
to control the situation by limiting dealing in foreign
exchange to strictly commercial and necessary personal
needs. Eventually the condition got so critical that there
was nothing much for China to do but place an embargo on
1. National City Bank Bulletin. November 1934.
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silver. The export tax on bullion or sycee silver was
raised from to 10$, in addition an equalization fee
which would make up the difference between the price in
London and the rate of exchange fixed by the Central Bank
of China. This action placed China— as far as interna-
tional relations were concerned, - on a managed currency.
The Chinese had felt even before our policy of buy-
ing silver was adopted that a rise in the price of silver,
artifically caused, and occuring very rapidly, would bring
trouble to China. Mr. K. C. Li, Chinese engineer, in
discussing the relation of silver to Chinese internal and
external trade, to the Council on Foreign Relation of New
York, on April 3, 1934, had said, "If the metallic silver
is taken away from China, it would mean that she would have
no medium of exchange. You gentlemen should understand
what a catastrophe that would be.
Assume that only a part of it is taken away from China.
It will mean the tightness of money and the tightness of
money will mean deflation and depression, and a run on banks
the same as you had in March, 1933. China cannot afford to
lose much of her silver, just as you cannot afford to lose
much of your gold. If you had to go off the gold standard
because of heavy withdrawal of gold, would not China have
to go off the silver standard if the withdrawal of silver
is too heavy? if the United States has suffered from
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falling internal prices due to an exaggerated value of
the dollar, so would China suffer if the external value
of her money was increased. If a lower gold dollar is
essential to higher commodity price in America, would
not a lower silver dollar be necessary if higher commod-
ity prices are to be desired in China?
China does not believe that any lesiglation for
higher gold prices of silver alone will do any good for
silver, if not accompanied by higher gold prices in
general and by the reduction of unscientific tariffs
which prohibit China’s exports." (1).
The silver emoargo however, was not sufficient to
prevent silver from leaving China. There was the embargo
but it was impossible to prevent smuggling. If we look
at the exports of silver from Manchuria and Japan, we
realize the great deal which must have left China. (2).
There was a reduction in the silver stocks in Shanghai which
would indicate that silver was going somewhere.
May 447,280,000
June 446,220,000
Aug. 381,640,000
July 426,420,000
Sept. 348,460,000
Oct. 320,360,000
Nov. 283,000,000
Dec. 267,000,000
1. National Bank Bulletin, June 1934.
2. Boston Transcript, Oct. 2, 1934.
3. National Bank Bulletin, January 1935.
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Conditions grew steadily worse. The rise of silver
price was hard on industry. New York Times gives the follow-
ing reduction in industry during the months ending Dec. 15,
The rise was also hard on the peasant of China, for
they receive so little for their commodities • Those who
owned their own land were worse off than those who rented,
for in most cases, those who rented paid for their goods
in produce, - while the land owners had to pay taxes which
were not reduced.
China has lost her purchasing power because of her in-
ability to export her commodities. It is all very well for
the United States to say, - raise the price of silver and
increase China’s purchasing power, - but China’s purchasing
power is not measured in silver, - it is measured in export
trade.
1934
Weaving and spinning
Platmaking
Silk filatures
Dyestuffs
Printing
Painting
Electrical Appliances
Ironworks and Glass
Rubber Goods
25%
30%
80%
40%
45%
40%
45%
50%
50%
1. New York Times Dec. 18, 1934
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This fluctuation in silver prices naturally had an
effect on the foreign exchange rates with China. We have
noted them in the foreign exchange section under the
United States.
V/hen we realize that when the exchange rates dropped
in the United States, they rose in China, - we can see
that China’s hope of buying from abroad steadily declined.
This difficulty gave impetus to national sentiment and
stimulated measures to make the country more self-suffi-
cient. At a meeting held in December, the Central Execu-
tive Committee of the Kuomintang, which is the nationalist
party, ’’went on record in favor of higher import duties, and
even adopted a resolution urging the Nationalist Govern-
ment to establish an automobile factory as part of a domes-
tic industrial expansion program. At the time, it is re-
ported that public opinion is running high against the
United States which is considered to be pursuing a course
inimical to China". (1}*
The climax of the Chinese situation had not yet been
reached. During the spring of 1935, the price of silver
continued to rise, with the natural rise in speculation
resulting.
1. Sir Arthur Salter. China and Silver. Page 96.
Brookings Institute, Washington, D. C. Institute of
Economic Publications, 1934.
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It was known that silver was leaving China in large
quantities and no one knew exactly what to do about it.
On May 12, the Minister of Finance, Dr. H. H. Kung, says,
"Silver Purchase Act has caused severe drain on China’s
silver revenue and construction of nation’s currency and
credit’’, - he continued, saying that China was "forced to
depend upon borrowings to meet current expenses'*. (1).
Toward the end of October 1935, the Chinese exchange
began to fluctuate rather widely. On October 15, 1934, the
exchange was thirty-four cents, - in May, 1935, it was forty-
one cents, and the day before nationalization it was thirty-
and one -half cents, a drop of 2C$ in two weeks.
To those who noticed this, - it wasn’t too surprising
when China announced, on November 4th, that she was legally
leaving the silver standard for a managed paper currency.
The London times for November 4, 1935, gives the follow-
ing summary of the provision of the act.
1. "A new paper currency shall take the place of the ancient
silver dollar.
2. The existing bank note issue shall be withdrawn and re-
placed by one single note issue.
3. This note issue will be the monopoly of a modern Central
Bank.
(1). Commercial and Financial Chronicle. May 18, 1935.
Page 3307.
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4. The Government owned Central Bank will be reconstruc-
ted and converted into a modern Central Bank, which
will be charged with maintaining the stability of
the currency,
5. The new paper currency will be inconvertible,
6. The formal monopoly of the note issue will come into
force in two years,
7. The Budget is to be balanced within eighteen months.
8. All silver will be nationalized on much the same lines
as gold has been nationalized in the United States.”
( 1 ).
Dr. H. H. Kung, Chinese Minister of Finance, says,
"The new monetary policy means neither suspension of bank-
note convertibility, nor abandonment of the silver stand-
ard for the currency. It is rather a suspension of the
circulation of silver currency in the market. (2).
China's abandonment of silver caused much excitement,
for people wondered whether she would tie up with Great
Britain or Japan. Sir Frederick, as Representative of
the British Government, had been in Japan trying to inter-
est the Japanese to combine in a joint effort to stabilize
Chinese currency. Japan refused, so he went across to
China and talked with the Chinese Nanking Government.
There were rumors that he promised a fifty-million dollar
1. The London Times. November 4, 1935.
2. The Boston Transcript. November 6, 1935.
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British exchange stabilization loan, but in return he asked
for a monopoly in reconstruction of China’s railway system.
China, however, acted quickly, and before Great Britain or
Japan realized, the Chinese currency was tied to that of
the British ports of China.
China is in a truly grave position. Her people have
always used silver, — they will have to be taught to use
paper. Also, - there is the problem of collecting the
silver that is now distributed through the entire country.
Edward Kann, in Eastern Exchanges Technical service, - pub-
lished in Vienna, writes, "The adoption of a so-called man-
aged currency offers only great difficulties in a country
where the population has for centuries been accustomed to
the handling of hard money, but it is liable to bring about
open rebellion. It is far easier to stop at xhe frontier a
relative handful of smugglers in actual possession of the
metal, than to impound the metallic possessions of 400,000,
000 people. One reads without astonishment of the refusal
of northern China bankers to part with the metal, of the Japan-
ese’s promise to protect those who refuse, and the Nanking
government’s bland reply that the metal would be considered
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seized to those northern vaults”. (1)*
We realize more than ever the seriousness of
the condition when we read a contemplation of
managed currency in China by Mr. Roberts of the
National City Bank, New York. "China in irs present
state of economic development is ill-suited to an
inconvertible currency. The people are accustomed
only to a limited extent to the use of paper money,
and any attempt to introduce a non-metallic standard
would provoke widespread and serious unrest, in the
opinion of those familiar with Chinese conditions.
Moreover, the country lacks the national unity
essential to general acceptance of a uniform paper
currency. Experimentation with inconvertible currency
is always dangerous, and would be particularly so in
China where political conditions are so unsettled.” (2).
1. National City Bank Bulletin. September 1935
2. Albion Evening Recorder. November 10, 1935.
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General Comments.
Mexico is the world r s chief producer of silver.
From the time Hernan Cortes took over Mexico in the
name of the King of Spain until today she has produced
over 5 1/2 billion ounces or 1/3 of the world supply.
The production figures from 1934-35 shows that she
produced 4l$ of the output for the year. ( 1 )
Silver Production 1934-1935*
Country 193^ 1935
United States 2b.
4
3^.4
Mexico 7 1}-.,
1
72.2
Canada 16 . 4 16.4-
South America 16.0 25.0
All other countries 52.2 54.5
In 1931 the mihes employed 3^,000 men and the metal-
lurgical plants 11,000. (1) Silver represents 2.0% of
Mexi cos exports. Consequently silver and the price of silver
have a good deal to do in determining the economic structure
of Mexico. It affects the personality of the people. They
are easy going, for there is always the hope that they will
find more silver and have plenty again. Silver has affected
Mexico geographically, for towns have grown up around the
mines. The third way, and perhaps the most interesting to
us, is the way silver affects the economic structure of
Mexico. Uhen the demand and price of silver are high, there
1. Silver in Relation to Mexican Trade. John Glenn Page 1.
Foreign Trade Council.
2. Handy and Harman, 20th Annual Review of the Silver
Market, 1935 Pandick Press, Inc. New York City 193&*
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is more demand for cotton, so silver stimulates the tex-
tile industry. Also there is more money in the treasury
and that means more new roads and more constructive work
in general. During the first six months of 1935 > there
was a surplus of over nineteen million pesos in the treas-
ury. (1) John Glenn summarizes the advantages of silver
to Mexico as follows: "First, a greater income to the
worker. This could not be appreciated without a further
explanation. './hen the price of silver increases, the
miners extract the lower grade of ores as a logical and
economic defense of their resources. It follows then,
that the miners work longer and receive more wages. The
second advantage, dependent on the first is that workers
increase their consumption of goods in general and spread
prosperity to many sections, which in turn increases pur-
chases from abroad. Thirdly, and lastly, this contributes
toward the life of the mining industry." (2)
Effects of a Rise in Silver Prices.
Yith this introduction we come to the time that the
United States started its buying policy to raise the price
of silver. Naturally a rise in the price stimulated produc-
1. Silver in Relation to Mexican Trade, John Glenn. Page 3.
Foreign Trade Council.
2. Handy and Harman, 20th Annual Review of the Silver Market
1935. Page 52* Pandick Press. New York City. 193&
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tion in Mexico as it had done in the United States. On
October 29, 1934, we find an interesting dispatch in the
Boston Herald. The headlines read, ‘'Mexico Selling Silver
to the United States”, with the subtitle, ‘'Treasury is
Buying Direct from Government
,
Morganthau Says”.
This is unusual considering the fact that earlier. in
the month Secretary of State Hull told China we dould not
trade directly with governments. The article continues by
saying that Mexico is the only country with which we have
such deals. From the Mexican standpoint it is a good thing
for it gives them dollar balances in the United States and
an outlet for the newly mined silver which it has 'obliged
itself to hold off the market under the international
silver agreement negotiated at the London Economic Confer-
ence”. (1) When we look at the export figures we can
readily see this. Below is a chart taken from the Commer-
cial and Financial Chronicle which gives us the exact
picture of the effect of the price on exports and imports.
Mexican Trade and the Price of Silver.
Year Silver Price Value of Trade Exports Imports
1923
1929
1930
1931
1932.
1933
1934
1935 (1/2)
53.1
52.9
3^.1
2^.7
27. g
7.7
£7.9
63 . b
950.1 592.4 357.7
973.0 590. $ 362.2
gog.7 456.6 350.1
695.3 366.7 216.5
465.7 304.3 160.9
609.3 364.9 244.4
9^4.7 64i.o 343.6
523.6
1. Boston Herald, October 29
,
1934.
2. Commercial and Financial Chronicle. May 4,1935 P. 2959,
..
.
-
v iir9|w
«
.
The pick-up in trade meant prosperity for the people.
But what happened to the currency? The peso usually fluc-
tuates between 3*30 to 3*^5 to the dollar. After the first
of January 1935, the peso reached 3‘6(K Vhen the price of
silver rose to 75 cents and above in April of 1935 , the
Mexican Government was in a predicament. Their currency
was worth more melted into silver bullion than as a pur-
chasing unit. What could they do? An ambassador was sent
to Washington to confer with Secretary of Treasury,
Morganthau* The Mexican Government had to close the banks
for a day. On the 26th, President Carendas issued a decree
directing the silver money in circulation to be exchanged
for paper notes backed by the Reserve of the Bank of Mexico.
The proclamation for the paper currency carried the
following provisions:
1. Issuance of one-peso bills by the Bank of Mexico
in unlimited circulation with compulsory accept-
ance as legal tender.
2. Some issuance of 1,2,5,10, and 20 centay copper
coins replacing silver pieces with the same
compulsion
.
3. All silver to be withdrawn from circulation to be
added to the Bank of Mexico T s reserves to guarantee
the paper bills.
. During the next 30 days silver coins will be legal
tender only up to a 20 peso limit.
4
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5. Bank of Mexico and Government offices will ex-
change new money for old at par.
6. All deposits, no matter if privately concealed
must be exchanged for new money, (l)
The New York Times received the following dispatch
on the situation. ,fAll banks will be closed tomorrow in
order to allow the Government a free hand and to avoid
disastrous speculation. The Government will issue a new
series of paper bills backed by reserves to be held by the
bank of Mexico. The President explained that the action
was unavoidable if national interests were to be protected
from undesirable speculation. During the day the peso
fluctuated between 3.30 and 3.45 to the dollar. Robert
Lopez, right hand man to Marciso Bassols, the Minister of
Finance, took a plane to Washington this afternoon with
Thomas L ockett to discuss the American situation arising
out of President Roosevelt f s policy of advancing the price
of silver. During the last two years in which the peso
has been held at 3.60 to the American dollar, Mexico, like
all mining and manufacturing countries must subsist mainly
on exports which will become impractical if currency in-
creases too much as compared with the dollar.” (2)
1. Boston Herald, October 29, 1934.
2. Commercial and Financial Chronicle. Page 2960.
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The conference seemed to he very satisfactory. Mr.
Lopez said on leaving Washington, "My conversation with
Mr. Morganthau came to a most satisfactory end, contrary
to current comment. My mission to this country was en-
tirely of a friendly nature. Our conversation covered
other aspects of the silver situation. As a silver produc-
ing and using nation, Mexico cannot help hut look favor-
ably upon the re-valuation of the metal. For this reason
she will he ready to cooperate toward the attainment of
that end. The Mexicans feel it will be readily accepted,
(paper currency), by the people and that no depreciation in
the value will occur so long as the Mexican Treasury main-
tains a large metallic reserve". (1). And so, Mexico, en-
joying a period of prosperity, goes on a paper standard.
When China abandoned silver in November, and the United
States let the market drop twenty points, Mexico became
anxious as to the future of the market. The last of Decem-
ber, Eduardo Saurez came to Washington to have a conference
with Mr* Morganthau on the silver situation. The reason for
the visit was not announced, though it was believed that the
withdrawal of the United States from the market was the
reason.
1. Commercial and Financial Chronical. Fage 2960
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It is understandable why Mexico should be so in-
tensely interested in the silver policy of the United
States. She is a producer, and although at the present
she is enjoying a period of prosperity, if the United
States withdrew entirely from the silver market—the
market would crash. With China no longer buying silver
and India dropping out, there is no demand except that
of the United States. Industry will always require some
silver but the proportion is very small. If a crash
oomes, Mexico would be severly hit, for silver is her
chief export— . With silver as her chief export, and
the United States as the sole support for the market—
naturally our policy is of the gravest concern to Mexico.
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India
First Uses of Silver
The people of India are in many ways like those of China
in their love and desire for silver. It is a tradition with
them, they have prized it and hoarded it as wealth for a long
time. When we stop and review the early history of currency
in India we find that gold was also used. One of the first
currencies used in India was a coin weighing 1.75 grains and
called the "rati”. In 1542, 100 ratis appeared as the
"rapyam”. (l) This is traced back to the Vedic times. An-
other early coin used in Southern India was the gold bun or
varaya stamped with the boar*s emblem and it f s subsidiary coin
( 1/10 of a varaya) the dirhem. (2) There were many systems
of private coinage. In 1600 Queen Elizabeth refused to allow
the East India Company to introduce the coins of the King of
Spain, but required that pieces, n should be coined with her
effigies on one side and the portcullis on the other, of the
Just weight and fineness of Spanish pieces of eight.” (3)
The first English rupee in 1677 was known as "Rupee of
Bombiam”. It wasn T t coined to any great extent until 1758
whe n British rule was established. Eight years later in 1766
the money of India was changed from copper and bullion to silver
with the resulting with drawal of silver from Russia, Scand-
inavia, England, etc. and consequent bank failures in those
countries.
Silver soon came into prominence. Probably partly for
1. Laughlin, History of Bimetalism in the United States. Page 310
2. Delmar, History of Bimetalism in the United States. Page 338
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the same reason we found it in China, namely that silver
being of less value could be coined in smaller denomi-
nations and as the majority of the people were poor, they
preferred several silver pieces to a single gold coin.
In 1853 the East India Company declared, by Act XVII,
the silver rupee to be the uniform coin for the whole of
British India, (l) After the discovery of gold in Australia
and California, gold poured into India. In 1868 gold be-
came legal tender at the ratio of 15:1. (2) From 1873 to
1893, the price of silver fell causing a fall in the com-
modity purchasing power of silver.
Fall in Price and Commodity Purchasing Power of Silver.
1873-1893
(1873 equaling 100)
Year Price P.P. Year Price P.P.
1873 100 100 1884 85 93
1874 98 92 1885 82 94
1875 96 103 1386 77 97
1876 89 100 1887 75 96
1877 92 77 1888 72 90
1878 89 72 1889 72 85
1879 86 79 1890 80 85
1880 88 91 1891 76 84
1881 87 101 1892 67 76
1882 87 102 1893 60 78
1883 85 101 (3) (4)
in interpreting this Kemmerer says, rT In India the value of
the rupee as measured by its purchasing power of commodities
varied less widely than did that of the pound sterling in Eng-
land, this is even truer if one eliminates the heavy drop in
1. Rupee equals 180 grains 11/12 fine.
2. Laughlin, History of Bimetalism in the United States. P. 316
3. Price—Laughlin, History of Bimetalism in the United States.
D. Appleton and Company, New York. Page 317.
4. Index of Purchasing Power—A.tlinson, Indian Prices. Page 276.
United States Bureau. Laboratory Bulletin. No. 173.
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value of the rupee during the period of Indian famine of
1877-9.
" (1)
The failure of the Brussels Conference on Bimetallism
in 1872 caused the Indian government to pass Act VIII on
June 26, 1893 to amend the Indian Coinage Act of 1870 and the
Indian Paper Currency Act of 1882, closing the mint to free
coinage, but reserving the right to coin on their own.
Recent Years in India.
Despite this India was still a vast market for silver.
The people had become used to the metal. They needed it for
ornaments and jewelry. During the marriage season there was
a great demand for silver. The inflow and outflow of silver
moved with the harvest seasons. 'Alien crops were good large
amounts of silver went inland to pay the farmers for their
grain. When the harvest season was poor, much silver came
out of hoarding to pay for necessary supplies. There is still
another difference between China and India. The Chinese silver
was hoarded as silver and could be very easily retreived in
case of emergency. In India on the other hand, the people
used the silver for ornaments and it meant melting down these
ornaments. Consequently silver remained in India longer than
it would in China,
During the world war. Great Britain had to borrow silver
to keep India on the gold-exchange standard. However, by 1926
the tables had turned and India was disposing of her silver.
The Royal Commission on Indian Currency and Finance recommended
1. Laughlin, History of Bimetallism in the United States, p.318
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that the Indian Treasury sell rupees until the minimum of
250,000,000 rupees was reached. This policy was adopted.
"In a large country like India the variation in volume of
currency required by the public is considerable and, be-
cause paper money is not widely used, it is necessary to
hold a fairly large amount of rupee coins in the reserve.
But the currency commission found the amount then in the
reserve to be unnecessarily large and recommended its reduc-
tion from about 850,000,000 rupees (292,187,500 fine ounces)
the amount held on April 30, 1929 to 250,000,000 rupees through
the melting and sale of coin over a 10-year period. This re-
commendation was adopted as a policy of the Indian Government.
But the 22nd of September 1931, just after Great Britain’s sus-
pension of the gold standard, found the Indian Treasury with a
stock of rupees not only reduced in accordance with the 10-
year plan (although over 100,000,000 fine ounces had been sold)
but actually increased from 850,000,000 rupees to over 1,532,
400,000 rupees, or by 455,606,000 ounces. Only six months
later the figure had declined to 1,106,100,000 rupees", (l)
There is another peculiarity of the Indian silver situa-
tion. The people of India to some extent preferred gold to
silver. In times of abundance we see that proportionately
more gold entered India than in poor times. However, in times
of famine, the people parted with their gold first.
In the year that followed the adoption of the Silver Purchas
1. Silver Market for 1932. United States Department of
Commerce. Washington D. C. Page 45.
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ing policy by the United States the silver imports of India
had a tendency to decrease. In 1931 and 1932- "the low price
of silver had resulted in fairly large imports. The silver
market in India has been practically destroyed. The Bombay
silver bullion market, one of the four leading markets for
silver in 1931 was forced to discontinue operation on
August 20, 1935.
India has not been too greatly effected economically
by the boost in silver prices. When the price of silver
reached $1 cents, there was some apprehension over the
possibility of the rupee being worth more as silver than
as bullion. The rupee is valued at $1.07 (1) The price
of silver came down again and the rupee was left unharmed.
Consequently we can agree that the rise in the market price
did not have any direct effect on India, but she is no
longer one of the chief consumers. In the year from 193^
to 1935 her consumption dropped from 15 million ounces to
5 million or a drop of 66$. (2)
1. Handy and Harman, 20th Ahnual Review of the Silver
Market. Pandick Press. New York 1936. Page 53*
2.. Same as 1. Page 5^.
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Summary
"The Silver Purchase Act of 1954"—A year and a half
has passed since this act was passed. Our Secretary of the
Treasury has carried out its dictates and purchased silver
in large quantities at artificially high prices to build
up the silver market.
We have traced the results of this buying on the four
main countries most directly affected by this silver policy
and now we come to the point of evaluating the facts.
First let us see what others think of the policy. Mr.
Herbert Hoover, in his address before the Ohio Society in New
York on November 16, 1935, denounced the whole program as
"folly" and charged that the Administration "had deliberately
bid up the price of foreign silver 50 per cent", and then had
"proceeded to buy vast quantities of that commodity, for which
we have no use, at enormous profits to foreigners", (l)
Dr. Herman F. Arendt says, "The President’s monetary pol-
icy is in danger of being attacked by the gold conservatives,
bankers and business men of the northeastern part of the
country, on the one hand, and the Thomas paper money inflat-
ionists on the other. This silver move, on the part of the
President, may best be understood as a bid for the support
of the not inconsiderable group of senators from the silver
states in behalf of the President’s policies. The measure is
1. Christian Science Monitor, December 11, 1935.
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not bimetallic, nor does it remonetize silver. It
merely arranges for the purchase of the output of mines
in the United States at a price of $.645 an ounce, which
is substantially above the world market. It is merely
a project designed to assist the silver mining industry
just as the cotton growers and other agricultural pro-
ducers were assisted by the Agricultural Adjustment Act".(l)
One of the chief reasons for the policy was to help
foreign trade, yet we see that the Foreign Trade Council
goes on record as favoring a repeal of the Silver Pur-
chasing Act. (2) In this respect Senator Key Pittman,
leader of the silverites says, T,The myth (of the hurt to
China and Chinese trade) is gone. It is dispelled. The
predictions were untrue. The statistics with regard to
the rise of silver throughout the world, the buying of
silver by governments, the buying of silver everywhere,
show that silver is a precious metal, that silver is
scarce, and thc.t silver must be had for monetary purposes
throughout the world. The statement that we are ruining
China is perfectly absured." (3) Could he be wrong?
The help it was supposed to bring to trade through
raising the price of the pound sterling was never received.
The price of silver did not go high enough to cause a
1. Boston Transcript, December 21, 1933
2. Congressional Record for 1935. Page 5608.
3. Final Declaration of the National Foreign Trade Council
Houston, Texas. Page 7.
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melting down of the rupee, so the only damage to India
was the drawing out of hoarded silver for sale at higher
prices. However, from the standpoint of the silver
market, India is no longer an important customer.
In regard to Japan, it tended to improve her rela-
tions with China because the later, incensed by the
damage done by our program and by our disregard for her
protest "recoiled" from the United States toward Great
Britain and Japan. It helped Japan for "that country
facilitated the smuggling of silver out of China and
later pursued a policy of draining silver out of the
northern areas to finance her operations there. The
silver was shipped to London for sales to the United
States", (l)
It is impossible to determine the extent of the dam-
age done to China by the policy. Conditions were far from
perfect in China before we started our buying policy. They
have grown steadily worse since 1934 until at present,
China with a very loosely organized central government is
trying to control a managed currency. A leading Chinese
financial journal in November 1935 says, "Business has
rarely been worse than in recent months". (2)
1. Bell, Silver Fiasco. Current History. January 1936 P. 473
2. Address by W. T. Moran, Vice President of the National
City Bank of New York. Delivered at the National
Foreign Trade Convention. Houston Texas.
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Even those who believe in the polciy begin to see
the fallacy in unnaturally high prices for silver in the
world market. Erownell of the American Smelting and Re-
fining Company, although he believes firmly that silver
should be bought from the local mines, says that 65 cents
an ounce is too high for foreign silver market prices,
that 60 cents would be better, (l)
Mexico was helped by our purchasing policy. She was
able to export silver at a good price which resulted in a
wave of prosperity. Nevertheless, if the silver policy has
ruined the future market for silver, Mexico will soon ex-
perience a depression in which conditions will be worse than
they were in 1931 and 1932.
It is impossible to know what the future will bring.
If as many believe, silver comes back as a monetary base,
there will be small losses to the United States from its
policy. However, if silver goes like copper did in the early
history of money and does not return, the United States
and Mexico will suffer severely.
The United States has not benefited to any great ex-
tent. It may have brought relief to the silver miners, but
it has been very hard on manufactures using silver as a raw
material. Alex Vincent, Secretary of the Silversmiths of
America, says, tTNo business, whatever it is could view an
1. Business Week, December 14, 1935. Foreign Panorama,
Page 40.
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advance like that in the price of its raw material with-
out serious concern”, (l) We have already pointed out
the fact that it did little for our foreign trade.
The President's hope that the policy would re-est-
ablish silver as an internationally recognized monetary
base failed completely. This is plainly seen in the case
of both China and Mexico, countries who were forced to
abandon silver.
Regardless of the temporary benefits of the policy,
no good can come from pegging the price of a commodity.
The late Senator Dwight W. Morrow once said, "that there
is no group of men wise enough, let alone disinterested
enough, to fix the price of any commodity. Ten years ago
the rubber industry had its Stevenson plan; the copper
industry, for a year, ending in the Spring of 1930, test-
ed the pegging theory; Brazil has suffered financial and
economic ills in an effort to peg the price of coffee; in
cotton, the Hoover administration once entertained the
idea of a 16 cent minimum (the price dropped to about 5
cents a pount in 1932), and now that the present idea under
th« AAA is for 12 cents, or better, it cannot be said that
pegging in this industry has been successful; effort to peg
wheat prices did not prevent on one fine December day in
1932 the lowest price in generations (Liverpool then report-
1. Keystone. November 1935. Page 56.
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ed the lowest levels since the days of Queen Elizabeth);
now witness the debacle in the silver market, following
the Treasury 1 s attempt at pegging, pursuant to the Silver
Purchase Act. The foregoing are but a few of the well-
known attempts (and failures) at price-pegging on an
international scale. But what may never be known is the
cost, direct and indirect, of these uneconomic adventures".
a)
1. Newr York Times, December 12, 1935.
,r
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Summary of the Effects of the
Silver Purchase Act of 1934.
At the present time the act has
1. Upset the world market for silver, and failed to
establish silver as an international basis for
money.
2. Created a monetary crisis in China upsetting the
internal and external trade, and ending with China’
a
having to nationalize silver.
3. Forced Mexico to adopt a paper standard, but
brought a period of prosperity as her exports of
silver at high prices increased.
4. Had a damaging effect on the United States foreign
trade with the Far East, but increased that with
Mexico. However, the net result was in all pro-
bability unfavorable.
5. Upset the silver manufacturing industry with a
constant fluctuation in the price of raw material.
6. Helped the silver mining interest in the United
States
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January
1932
24*
1933
19 7/8
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31 5/8
1935
38 3/8
February 23* 20* 31 5/8 coto
March 23i 20* 33 1/8 41
April 22* 23 7/8 33 7/8 39 3/8
May 22 3/8 25* 32 7/8 53 t
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Handy and Harman
.
20th AnnuaJ
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g£^he^ilver Market.
Silver Prices.
January 54.418/
February
March
54.602/
59.048/
April 67.788/
May 74.356/
June 71.940/
July 68 . 216/
August 66 . 366/
September 65.375/
October 65.375/
November 65.375/
December 58.420/ (1)
(1) Handy and Harman, Page 54, Pandick Press Inc.
Hew York, 1936

Public-No. 438-7 3D Congress
H. R. 9745
AN ACT
To authorize the Secretary of the Treasury to purchase silver,
issue silver certificates, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives
of the united States of America in Congress assembled , "That the
short title of this Act shall be the "Silver Purchase Act of
1934.
"
Sec. 2. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the
United States that the proportion of silver to gold in the
monetary stocks of the united States should be increased, with
the ultimate objective of having and maintaining, one fourth of
the monetary value of such stocks in silver.
Sec. 3. 7/henever and so long as the proportion of silver
in the stocks of gold and silver of the United States is less
than one-fourth of the monetary value of such stocks, the
Secretary of the Treasury is authorized and directed to purcn ase
silver, at home or abroad, for present or future delivery with
any direct obligations, coin, or currency of the United States,
authorized by law, or with any funds in the Treasury not other-
wise appropriated, at such rates, at such times, and upon such
terms and conditions as he may deem reasonable and most advant-
ageous to the public interest: Provided, That no purchase of
silver shall be made hereunder at a price in excess of the
monetary value thereof: And provided further, That no purchases
of silver situated in the continental United States on May 1,
1934, shall be made hereunder at a price in excess of 50 cents
a fine ounce.
Sec. 4. Whenever and so long as the market price of silver
exceeds its monetary value or the monetary value of the stocks
of silver is greater than 25 per centum of the monetary value of
the stocks of gold and silver, the Secretary of the Treasury may,
with the approval of the President and subject to the provisions
of section 5, sell any silver acquired under the authority of
this Act, at home or abroad, for present or future delivery at
such rates, at such times, and upon such terms and conditions
as he may deem reasonable and most advantageous to the public
interest
.
Sec. 5. The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized and
directed to issue silver certificates in such denominations as
he may from time to time prescribe in a face amount not less
than the cost of all silver purcnased under the Authority of
section 3, and such certificates snail be placed in actual
circulation. There shall be maintained in the Treasury as
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security for all silver certificates heretofore or hereafter
issued and at the time outstanding an amount of silver in
bullion and standard silver dollars of a monetary value equal
to the face amount of such silver certificates. All silver
certificates heretofore or hereafter issued shall be legal
tender for all debts, public and private, public charges,
taxes, duties, and dues, and shall be redeemable on demand at
the Treasury of the united States in standard silver dollars;
and the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to coin
st andard s ilver dollars for such redemption.
Sec. 6. Whenever in his judgment such action is necess-
ary to effectuate the policy of this Act, the Secretary of the
Treasury is authorized, with the approval of the President, to
investigate, regulate, or prohibit, by means of licenses or
otherwise, the acquisition, importation, exportation, or trans-
portation of silver and of contracts and other arrangements
made with respect thereto; and to require the filing of reports
deeraed by nim reasonably necessary in connection therewith*
Whoever willfully violates the provisions of any license, order,
rule, or regulation issued pursuant to the authorization con-
tained in this section shall, upon conviction, be fines not more
than $10 , 000 or, if a natural person, may be imprisoned for not
more than ten years, or both; and any officer, director, or
agent of any corporation who knowingly participates in such
violation may be punished by a like fine, imprisonment, or both.
Sec. 7. 'whenever in the judgment of the President such
action is necessary to effectuate the policy of this Act, he
may by Executive order require the delivery to the united States
mints of any or all silver by whomever owned or possessed. The
silver so delivered shall be coined into standard silver dollars
or otherwise added to the monetary stocks of the United States
as the President may determine; and there shall be returned
therefor in standard silver dollars, or any other coin or currency
of the United States, the monetary value of the silver so
delivered less such deductions for seigniorage, brassage, coin-
age, and other mint charges as the Secretary of the Treasury
with the approval of the President shall have determined:
Provided. That in no case shall the value of the amount returned
therefor be less than the fair value at the time of such order of
the silver required to be delivered as such value is determined
by the market price over a reasonable period terminating at the
time of such order. The Secretary of the Treasury shall pay all
necessary costs of the transportation of such silver and stand-
ard silver dollars, coin, or currency, including the cost of
insurance, protection, and such other incidental costs as may be
reasonably necessary. Any silver withheld in violation of any
Executive order issued under the section of or any regulations
issued pursuant thereto shall be forfeited to the United States,
and may be seized and condemned by like proceedings as those
provided by law for the forfeiture, seizure, and condeianat ion
of property imported into the United States contrary to law; and
in addition, any person failing to comply with the provisions of
any such Executive order or regulation shall be subject to a

penalty equal to twice the monetary value of the silver in
respect of which such failure occurred.
Sec. 8. Schedule A of title VIII of the Revenue Act of
1926, as amended (relating to stamp taxes), is amended by
adding at the end thereof a new subdivision to read as follows:
"10. Silver, and so forth, sales and Transfers.- On all trans-
fers of any interest in silver bullion, if the price for which
such interest is or is to be transferred exceeds the total of
the cost thereof and allowed expenses, 50 per centum of the
amount of such excess. On every such transfer there snail be
made and delivered by the transferor to the transferee a memo-
randum to which there shall be affixed lawful stamps in value
equal to the tax thereon. Every such memorandum shall show the
date thereof, the names and addresses of the transferor and
transferee, the interest in silver bullion to which it refers,
the price for which such interest is or is to be transferred
and the cost thereof and the allowed expenses. Any person liable
for payment of tax under this subdivision (or anyone who acts in
the matter as agent or broker for any such person) who is a party
to any such transfer, or who in pursuance of any such transfer
delivers any silver bullion or interest therein, without a
memorandum stating truly and completely the information herein
required, or who delivers any such memorandum without having
the proper stamps affixed hereto, with intent to evade the
foregoing provisions, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor
and upon conviction thereof shall pay a fine of not exceeding
$1,000 or be imprisoned not more than six months, or both.
Stamps affixed under this subdivision shall be canceled (in lieu
of the manner provided in section 804) by such officers and in
such manner as regulations under this subdivision shall prescribe.
Such officers shall cancel such stamps only if it appears that
the proper tax is being paid, and when stamps with respect to
any transfer are so canceled, the transferor and not the trans-
feree shall be liable for any addit ional tax found due or penal-
ty with respect to such transfer. The Commissioner shall abate
or refund, in accordance with regulations issued hereunder, such
portion of any tax hereunder as he finds to be attributable to
profits (1) realized in the course of the transferor’s regular
business of furnishing silver bullion for industrial, professional
or artistic use and (a) not resulting from a change in the
market price of silver bullion, or (b) offset by contemporaneous
losses incurred in transactions in interests in silver bullion
determined, in accordance with such regulations, to have been
specifically related hedging transactions; or (2) offset by
contemporaneous losses attributable to changes in the market
price of silver bullion and incurred in transactions in silver
foreign exchange determined, in accordance with such regulations
to have been hedged specifically by the interest in silver bullion
transferred. The provisions of this subdivision shall extend to
all transfers in the United States of any interest in silver
bullion, and to all such transfers outside the United States if
either party thereto is a resident of the United States or is a
citizen of the United States who has been a resident thereof
within three months before the date of the transfer or if such

silver bullion or interest therein is situated in the United
States; and shall extend to transfers to the United States
Government (the tax in such cases to be payable by the trans-
feror), but shall not extend to transfers of silver bullion by
deposit or delivery at a United States mint under proclamation
by" the President or in compliance with any Executive order issued
pursuant to section 7 of the Silver Purchase Act of 1934. The
tax under this subdivision on transfers enumerated in subdivision
4 shall be in addition to the tax under such subdivision. This
subdivision shall apply (1) with respect to all transfers of any
interest in silver bullion after the enactment of the Silver Pur-
chase Act of 1934 and (2) with respect to all transfers of any
interest in silver bullion in May 15, 1934, or after, and prior
to the enactment of the Silver Purchase Act of 1934, except that
in such cases it shall be paid by the transferor in such manner
and at such time as the Commissioner, with the approval of the
Secretary of the Treasury, may by regulations prescribe, and the
requirements of a memorandum of such transfer shall not apply.
"As used in this subdivision-
"The term "cost” means the cost of the interest in silver bullion
to the transferor, except that (a) in case of silver bullion pro-
duced from materials containing silver which has not previously
entered into industrial, commercial, or monetary use, the cost to
a transferor who is the producer shall be deemed to be the market
price at the time of production determined in accordance with
regulations issued hereunder: (b) in the case of an interest in
silver bullion acquired by the transferor otherwise than for
valuable consideration, the cost shall be deemed to be the cost
thereof to the last previous transferor by whom it was required
for a valuable consideration; and (c) in the case of any interest
in silver bullion acquired by the transferor (after April 15, 193 4)
in a wash sale, the cost shall be deemed to be the cost to him of
the interest transferred by him in such wash sale, but with proper
adjustment, in accordance with regulations under this subdivision,
when such interests are in silver bullion for delivery at difrerent
times.
"The term "Transfer" means a sale, agreement of sale, agree-
ment to sell memorandum of sale or delivery of, or transfer,
whether made by assignment in blank or by any delivery, or ty any
paper or agreement or memorandum or any other evidence of transfer
or sale; or means to make a transfer as so defined.
"The term "interest in silver bullion" means any title or
claim to, or interest in, any silver bullion or contract therefor.
"The term "allowed expenses" means usual and necessary expen-
ses actually incurred in holding, processing, or transporting the
interest in silver bullion as to which an interest is transferred
(including storage, insurance, and transportation charges but not
including interest, taxes, or charges in the nature of overhead).
"The term "memorandum" means a bill, memorandum, agreemsnt
,
or other evidence of a transfer.
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"The term "wash sale" means a transaction involving
the transfer of an interest in silver bullion and, within
thirty days before or after such transfer, the acquisition
by the same person of an interest in silver bullion. Only
so much of the interest so acquired as does not exceed the
interest so transferred, and only so much of the interest
so transferred as does not exceed the interest so acquired,
shall be deemed to be included in the wash sale.
"The term "silver bullion" means silver which has been
melted, smelted or refined as is in such state or condition
that its value depends primarily upon the silver content and
not upon its form."
Sec 9. The Secretary of the Treasury is hereby author-
ized to issue, with the approval of the President, such
rules and regulations as the Secretary of the Treasury may
deem necessary or proper to carry out the purposes of this
Act, or of any order issued hereunder.
Sec. 10. As used in this Act-
The term "person" means an individual, partnership,
association or corporation:
The term "the continental United States" means the States
of the United States, the District of Columbia, and the
Territory of Alaska;
The term "monetary value" means a value calculated on the
basis of fl for an amount of silver or gold equal to the amount
at the time contained in the standard silver dollar and the
gold dollar, respectively;
The term "stocks of silver" means the total amount of
silver at the time owned by the United States (whether or not
held as security for outstanding currency of the United States]
and of silver contained in coins of the United States at the
time outstanding;
The term "stocks of gold" means the total amount of gold
at the time owned by the United States, whether or not held as
a reserve or as security for any outstanding currency of the
United States.
Sec. 11. There is authorized to be appropriated, out of
any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, the sum
of $500,000, which shall be available for expenditure under
the direction of the President and in his discretion, for any
purpose in connection with the carrying out of this Act; and
there are hereby authorized to be appropriated annually such
additional sums as may be necessary for such purposes.
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Sec. 12, The right to alter, amend, or repeal this Act is
hereby expressly reserved. If any provision of this Act,
or the application thereof to any person or circumstances,
is held invalid, the remainder of the Act, and the applica-
tion of such provision to other persons or circumstances,
shall not be affected thereby.
Sec. 13* All Acts and parts of Acts inconsistent with any
of the provisions of this Act are hereby appealed, but the
Authority conferred in this Act upon the President and the
Secretary of the Treasury is declared to be supplemental to
the authority heretofore conferred.
Approved, June 19, 1934, 9 P.M,
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